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There has been much speculation and editorializing over the deterioration 
of trans-Atlantic relations, specifically between the United States and Germany, 
primarily as a result of the US-led war against Iraq beginning in March 2003.  
What can account for this so-called trans-Atlantic rift and the unhealthy US-
German relationship of late?   
This thesis argues that this deterioration in trans-Atlantic relations stems 
from a profound misunderstanding of strategic culture.  Specifically, this thesis 
takes the position that a failure to appropriately understand what Germany’s 
unique strategic culture has been a leading cause of the present uncomfortable 
relationship between the United States and Germany.  This thesis shows how a 
nation’s values, beliefs, and preconceptions, can have a powerful influence upon 
foreign and security policy decisions.  It highlights the importance of strategic 
culture as an important influence upon a nation’s efforts to transform its armed 
forces.   
This thesis includes an examination of the various definitions and theories 
surrounding strategic culture and its impact upon the policy making process.  It 
explores German defense reform since the end of the Cold War, and includes a 
look at how these issues have influenced German military transformation efforts 
since 1990.  This case study concludes with a look at the current challenges 
facing German defense transformation, and makes observations about how a 
better understanding of Germany’s national security culture can contribute to 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1960s, too few American observers of policy have 
given enough attention to the workings of diplomacy and strategy 
amongst the Atlantic democracies.1   
 Donald Abenheim 
Characterizations of an “old” and “new” Europe; concerns over a dying 
NATO; proposed plans to reduce US military bases in Western Europe in favor of 
opening new ones in Eastern Europe; no phone call from the US President 
congratulating the German Chancellor on his re-election—what can account for 
such unhelpful and problematic developments in trans-Atlantic relations?  Why 
has the relationship between two of the world’s most trusted and reliable allies 
come to such a situation?   
 This thesis argues that such a deterioration in trans-Atlantic relations 
stems from a profound misunderstanding and lack of appreciation for what is 
most commonly called strategic culture.  Specifically, this thesis takes the 
position that a failure to appropriately understand what is a distinctly national and 
unique German strategic culture has been a main cause of the present 
uncomfortable relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, as well as troubled relations among the most senior NATO member 
countries.  While such factors as political and strategic culture have been a part 
of political science and foreign policy analysis for decades, there is a relatively 
small body of literature which addresses the specific relationship between, what 
is termed in this thesis, national security culture and actual foreign and security 
policy decision making.   
This thesis attempts to show how a nation’s values, beliefs, and 
preconceptions (in short, its national security culture), can have a powerful 
influence upon the foreign and security policy decision making process at all 
                                            
1 Donald Abenheim, Foreword, Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt 
Institutions and Practices, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania: December 1996), p. ix.  
2 
levels.  Moreover, this study highlights the importance of strategic culture as an 
important influence upon a nation’s efforts to reform and transform its armed 
forces—a contemporary theme in virtually every modern Western democracy 
since the end of the Cold War.   
Specific research questions to be explored in this thesis include: What is 
the relationship of strategic culture to foreign and security policy decision 
making?  What can be learned from a better examination and understanding of 
German strategic culture?  What are the major influences of strategic culture on 
Germany’s efforts to transform and modernize its armed forces?  How can a 
better understanding and appreciation of the effects of national security culture 
on foreign and security policy contribute to improved US-German relations?       
The case will be made that not only does culture matter when it comes to 
such specific national decisions as defense reform and military deployments, but 
also that failing to adequately understand and appreciate the peculiarities of a 
nation’s security culture (in this case that of Germany) can, and does, lead to a 
deterioration of bi-lateral relations and is a major cause of the current difficulties 
facing US-German relations today.  This thesis uses a process-tracing 
methodology to examine the evolution of German strategic culture since the end 
of the Cold War, and the resulting security and defense reforms since 1990.  The 
study uses a survey of the pertinent primary and secondary scholarly literature 
on the topic stemming from governmental publications, documented policies, and 
the writings of regional experts and other foreign and security policy intellectuals.  
Sources include first hand interviews with government, parliamentary, and 
military officials; editorials from German academics and security and defense 
policy observers; as well as applicable mass media articles and scholarly 
journals.     
This examination will begin in the next chapter with a closer look at what is 
considered strategic culture, and a review of the major theories related to its 
influence on foreign and security policy.  Additionally, it will describe the specific 
nature of what can be called German national security culture both before and 
3 
since the end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1990.  Having gained 
a better understanding for what is German national security culture, the essay 
will then turn in Chapter III to one of the most important manifestations of 
German security and defense policy—the reform and transformation of the 
German armed forces (the Bundeswehr).  This chapter looks at the history of 
Bundeswehr reform efforts since the dramatic events of 1989-1990, and tries to 
explain the major political and strategic goals behind such reform.  It outlines the 
struggles involved with successful execution of military transformation, and the 
ways in which German strategic culture have influenced defense reform efforts.   
Finally, Chapter IV is a concluding chapter which seeks to put the issues 
explored throughout this thesis into a current perspective by making some 
observations about how the major political parties, government officials, and the 
soldiers themselves see German security and defense reform.  It ends with a few 
generalizations as to how a better appreciation for what is German national 
security culture, and its past experiences, can lead to not only better relations 
among allies and partners, but also how a better understanding even among 
German leaders can help them through the myriad of challenges and decisions 
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II. GERMAN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
A. THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DEBATE 
For decades political scientists, international relations experts, and foreign 
policy observers have debated over which set of forces influences the foreign 
policy decisions of democratic nations more—internal forces or external forces.  
Internal, also called domestic, forces are those factors which influence policy 
makers from inside the nation, such as domestic public opinion, political party 
positions, and the mindset of political elites.  External forces are those factors 
which influence policy makers from outside the nation, such as alliance and 
international organization relationships, neighboring countries’ policies, and 
regional or international crises.   
Those favoring the primacy of internal factors usually point to the desire of 
governments to get re-elected, and the need to maintain a political balance in 
favor of the government as evidence for their claim.  This camp holds that 
international pressures alone are insufficient to explain the scope, direction, and 
timing of policy decisions, and that “foreign policy is affected less by fears of 
other countries’ relative gains or losses than it is by the domestic distributional 
consequences of cooperative endeavors.”2  Those favoring the primacy of 
external factors believe that changes in the external operating environment are 
most often catalysts for a reorientation of state behavior.  To that end, foreign 
policy is essentially the mechanism a state uses to carry out this reorientation 
and to adapt to changes in its environment.3  This camp also goes on to predict 
when a nation’s foreign policy is most likely to change: “when developments 
                                            
2 Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 9-10.   
3 See Bengt Sundelius, Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the 
European Community, in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds., European Foreign Policy: The 
EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 177-201; and James N. 
Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics (New York: 
Nichols Publishing, 1981), p. 42.  
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abroad give rise to potential threats to their essential structures.”4  Most foreign 
policy change results from external shocks, or “dramatic international events.”5   
Strong cases can be, and have been, made on both sides of this debate.  
To be sure, there are times when one can ascertain that domestic influences 
were paramount in a country’s foreign policy decision and times when external 
influences were the driving factor.  Certainly it is not the aim of this research to 
attempt a stand on one side or the other of this debate.  Instead, the thesis of this 
research is that the primary factors in determining foreign policy decisions, at 
least as far as Germany is concerned, are not internal or external factors but 
rather the way in which both sets of factors are viewed.  In borrowing from the 
ground breaking work of the late Wolfram Hanrieder, this thesis argues that one 
must examine the linkages between the “internal predispositions” of the country 
(including value systems and political culture) and conditions in the external 
environment in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy.  
Hanrieder felt that foreign policy restructuring ultimately hinges on compatibility 
and consensus.  Compatibility refers to “the degrees of feasibility of various 
foreign policy goals, given the strictures and opportunities of the international 
system,”6 and consensus is “the amount of domestic political agreement 
regarding the ends and means of foreign policy change.”7   
It is in the examination of these linkages and the ability to find compatibility 
and consensus, that the issue of culture looms large.  For it is the idea of culture, 
political and strategic, which provides the lens through which these linkages 
between internal and external factors are viewed, colored, and analyzed.  It is 
precisely those “predispositions” held by a population and its political elite which 
                                            
4 James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World 
Politics (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1981), p. 42. 
5 Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign 
Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, 1990, p. 14.  
6 Wolfram Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage 
of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 
61, no. 4, December 1967, p. 1977.   
7 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since 
Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 7.   
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determine not only the amount of compatibility and consensus needed to reach a 
decision, but which form the very basis of a nation’s foreign policy conscious, 
thereby influencing which policy options are even to be considered and which 
ones are not.   
This type of cultural approach is extremely useful in explaining Germany’s 
foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War, which has thus far not 
been consistent with a purely realist, neo-realist, or structuralist explanation.  In 
recent decades, more and more scholars have begun to adopt a more culturally 
oriented approach when seeking to account for the foreign and security policies 
of states, especially in reference to post-Cold War Germany.  The recent works 
of authors like Berger, Duffield, Lantis, Otte, Pye, Risse-Kappen and Verba have 
served to shed new light on the importance of political, strategic, and military 
culture when it comes to studying democratic nations’ foreign and security policy 
decisions.8  This trend is, at least in part, due to the failure of neo-realism to 
adequately explain the dramatic yet peaceful turn of events in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  By taking both domestic political conditions (including political 
military culture) and external “strategic dilemmas”9 into account, one can fully 
analyze and appreciate the set of internal-external linkages which have 
determined German national security policy since 1991.   
That being said, what has been the nature of German foreign and security 
policy since the end of the Cold War, and why has it, according to John Duffield, 
                                            
8 Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).  John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and 
State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” International Organization, vol. 53, no. 4, 
Autumn 1999, pp. 756-803.  Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German 
Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).  Max Otte, A Rising 
Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, (New York, NY: St Martin’s 
Press, 2000).  Lucian W. Pye, “Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development,” and 
Sidney Verba, “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture,” in Pye and Verba, eds., Political 
Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).  Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, 
and International Institutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
9 This phrase is taken from Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of 
German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).    
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confounded neo-realists?10  Moreover, did the dramatic changes in world politics 
from 1989 to 1991 lead to an equally dramatic change in the foreign and security 
policy of a newly unified Germany?  Since unification, is Germany’s foreign policy 
a story of continuity or a story of change?  To properly answer these questions 
one must gain at least a basic understanding for what German foreign and 
security policy was like before the events of 1989-1990, during the forty-plus 
years of the Cold War.   
 
B. COLD WAR GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
As Lantis points out, “the foundation for contemporary German foreign 
policy was established during the Cold War, when the Federal Republic (as West 
Germany) pursued one of the most consistent foreign affairs profiles of any 
democracy from 1949 to 1990.”11  This consistent profile focused on the themes 
of restraint, humanitarianism, and multilateral cooperation.  Known as 
Westbindung (meaning a totally Western oriented foreign policy) under German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and later called Verantwortungspolitik, or foreign 
policy of responsibility, Germany felt the weight of its past transgressions and 
sought refuge in the cooperative institutions of the European Community (EC), 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN).12  
Also a key part of Germany’s foreign policy stance was the restrictions (both 
allied-imposed and self-imposed) on any type of assertive military posture.  This 
theme became deeply rooted in the public psyche, in foreign policy tradition, and 
in the German Basic Law, or Grundgesetz.13  During this period, Oxford historian 
Timothy Garton Ash argued that the Federal Republic “excelled at the patient, 
                                            
10 John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds 
Neorealism,” International Organization, vol. 53, no. 4, Autumn 1999, pp. 756-803. 
11 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since 
Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 2.    
12 The term Westbindung was used by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer immediately 
after WWII, and the term Verantwortungspolitik was developed later by former German Foreign 
Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, see Lantis, p. 2.   
13 See Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).  
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discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral institutions and 
negotiations.”14   
As the Cold War progressed into a bi-polar contest between the US-NATO 
forces on one side and the USSR-Warsaw Pact on the other, Germany found 
itself squarely in the Mittellage,15 sandwiched between the two nuclear powers.  
This realization, along with Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik beginning in 
1969, resulted in Germany pursuing a very methodical, predictable, and low-
profile foreign policy designed to prove Germany’s reliability as an ally, recognize 
the status quo of a partitioned Germany, and highlight West Germany’s 
commitment to never ‘go it alone’ in world affairs.     
During the Cold War, there were several reasons for Germany to pursue 
this type of foreign policy.  The first reason was the Soviet threat, in both its 
military and ideological form.  As already mentioned, West Germany was on the 
front line of the principal theater of any East-West confrontation (the Mittellage).  
Therefore, in order to achieve at least some measure of security from the 
Soviets, Germany had to forge and maintain strong alliance ties with the Western 
powers while simultaneously trying to avoid any moves that might antagonize the 
Soviet Union.  Additionally, after joining NATO, this meant making a large 
contribution to its own national defense.16   
The second reason for a restrained foreign policy was West Germany’s 
dependency upon the United States for security.  Having renounced any 
intentions to build or obtain nuclear weapons as the price of admission into 
NATO, Germany depended upon the nuclear umbrella provided by the United 
States for its security.  This naturally obliged West Germany to avoid pursuing                                             
14 Timothy Garton Ash, “Germany’s Choice,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, July-August 1994, p. 
71.  
15 For a more detailed analysis of this concept see Helga Haftendorn, “Gulliver in der Mitte 
Europas: Internationale Verflechtung und nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten,“ in Karl Kaiser and 
Hanns W. Maull, eds., deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band 1: Grundlagen (München: 
Oldenbourg, 1994).   
16 James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and 




any policy which might be seen as in conflict with the Western powers, lest she 
risk losing the protection provided.  This need for maintaining Western support 
continued to influence German foreign policy even after many of the formal 
controls that had been placed on German armaments were removed.17   
A third reason for Germany’s Cold War policy of restraint and caution was 
the physical partition of its territory into East and West.  This situation only 
intensified the precarious position of the Mittellage.  On the one hand, West 
Germany needed Western support if it was ever to realize unification in the 
future, but on the other hand, if Germany did not seek at least some level of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union it might never break the status quo.  Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik was Germany’s main and most well-known effort to strike the 
appropriate balance between these two competing sides.  This meant that 
sometimes German foreign and security policy was at odds with the desires and 
expectations of its Western partners, one example being the Euro-missiles 
dispute in the 1980s.18   
The final source of constraint on German foreign policy during this time 
rested in the “historically conditioned attitudes” of Germany’s neighbors toward 
the Federal Republic.  Perhaps the best expression of this sentiment is the much 
quoted description of why NATO was created: ‘to keep the Russians out, the 
Americans in, and the Germans down.’  As a result of “Germany’s past 
transgressions,”19 namely starting two world wars in the same century and the 
violence of the Nazi period, most countries were strongly inclined to view any and 
all German actions with suspicion and mistrust.  This burden of the past, and 
Germany’s need to control it, was yet another reason to adopt policies intended 
to reassure its neighbors that it would never again pose a threat to them and to 
avoid actions that might be perceived as suspect.  One very tangible result of this 
                                            
17 James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 
42. 
18 James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy After Unification, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1998, p. 
42. 
19 Ibid. p.43.  
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situation was the high degree to which the German armed forces (the 
Bundeswehr) were integrated into NATO command and control structures.  In 
fact, Germany did not have an autonomous national planning or command 
structure for its armed forces until the late 1990s, and even then the move 
sparked sharp criticism from the German press.20        
As a result of these several constraints, German foreign and security 
policy, and even the German nation itself, emerged radically different from the 
other major European powers.  Notable experts and authors have each chosen 
to describe Germany’s unique situation somewhat differently, but the overall 
impression is very similar; Germany had, over the course of time, developed a 
distinct and unique strategic culture and national security character which was 
profoundly affected by the dramatic events of German unification and the end of 
the Cold War.   
Hanns Maull characterized Germany as a “civilian power” with very 
different motives than those usually ascribed to states by the realist school of 
thought.  Civilian power objectives include: 
a. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the 
pursuit of international objectives; b. the concentration on non-
military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with 
military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to 
safeguard other means of international interaction; and c. a 
willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical 
issues of international management.21   
This same general analysis holds true for Kielinger and Otte who call Germany a 
“pressured power” while Gray spoke of Germany as the “reluctant power.”22  
Even Otte’s later work, describing German foreign policy after unification and the 
                                            
20 See Thomas-Durell Young, “German National Command Structures After Unification: A 
New German General Staff?” Armed Forces and Society 22, no. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 19-21.   
21 Hanns Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5 
(1990/91): pp. 91-107.  Hanns Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue 
deutsche Außenpolitik,“ Europa-Archiv 47, no. 1 (1992): pp. 269-78.   
22 Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte, “Germany—the Pressured Power,” Foreign Policy 91, no. 
2 (1993): pp. 44-62.   
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Cold War, refers to Germany as a potentially “rising middle power.”23  Likewise, 
James Duffield’s analysis of German security policy is titled World Power 
Forsaken.24  All of these terms and ideas share the general thesis that from 1945 
until 1989 Germany became a major defender of the status quo in Europe.  
Germany was, and is, content with pursuing its three major national interests in a 
low-profile and non-threatening way—a strong security relationship with the 
United States, economic integration in Europe, and stability in Eastern Europe 
and Russia.25  Even the realist in the group, Max Otte, realizes that Germany 
does not have the potential to become, and truly does not wish to become, a 
global power.26   
 So then, if there is consensus as to the nature of German foreign and 
security policy during the Cold War, and evidence shows that there is, the 
question now becomes what can be said of German foreign and security policy 
after the Cold War and since German unification?  Has there been a change in 
the way a newly sovereign and unified Germany, free of the Soviet threat to the 
East, conducts its foreign affairs?  More to the point, in the wake of the break up 
of the Soviet Union, has German foreign policy “normalized” in the realist sense 
so as to spark concerns of a “resurgent Germany”? 
 
C. POST-COLD WAR GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY       
The short answer to all the above questions is no.  In much the same way 
as there was general consensus as to the nature and tone of German foreign 
and security policy during the Cold War, there seems to be almost as much 
consensus as to the overall character of Germany’s foreign and security policy 
                                            
23 Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, 
(New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2000). 
24 James S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy After Unification, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
25 Wolfgang Gehring, in the introduction to Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the 
Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 
p. x.  
26 Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, 
(New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 7.   
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since the 1989-1991 time frame.  That consensus says what can now be 
confirmed by 14 years of history.  Namely that there was no radical change in 
German foreign affairs behavior after the Cold War; that Germany did not use its 
new-found freedom of action to pursue a more aggressive or more militaristic 
foreign policy; and finally, that German foreign and security policy since 
unification has been marked by a high degree of continuity and moderation.     
The reality was, in fact, that Germany did not seek to regain its past world 
power status, and instead exercised considerable restraint and circumspection in 
its external relations since unification.  Despite some concerns that a united 
Germany may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or allow its previous alliance ties 
to lapse in an effort to once again play the role of a great power, this simply did 
not happen.27  Quite contrary to these neo-realist predictions, Germany has 
firmly stated its commitment to maintain alliance ties, especially with NATO, and 
has played a leading role in strengthening other European security frameworks 
such as the OSCE and the European Union.  Germany has continued to 
emphasize the use of non-military means wherever possible to achieve security, 
while simultaneously reducing their own military capabilities and force structure, 
not to mention its lack of interest whatsoever in acquiring nuclear weapons.28  It 
was not until 2002/2003, when Germany had to make some hard choices 
concerning the global war on terrorism and the US-led action against Iraq, that 
Germany took a high profile and controversial stance in the foreign policy arena 
which seemed to contradict this pattern.   
Saying that there is overall consensus among the leading experts as to 
the nature of post-Cold War German foreign and security policy does not mean 
there is no disagreement.  As with the analysis of any nation’s foreign policy 
actions, there are always those with different interpretations of the same overall 
outcome.  In the case of Germany, the agreement found on the issue of overall 
post-Cold War foreign policy continuity is interlaced with those that also stress 
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the ways in which German foreign and security policy has changed.  Specifically 
writers Max Otte and Jeffrey Lantis point out the areas where Germany has 
indeed behaved much differently than it would have before 1991. In his book, 
Lantis points to German actions in the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis; Bundeswehr 
participation in Somalia in 1993; Germany’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
and participation in the Balkans in 1991-1994; diplomatic and military 
involvement in Bosnia 1992-1996; and German responses to the crisis in Kosovo 
in 1998-1999.29  He outlines how Germany’s actions in each one of these events 
constituted a struggle to restructure its foreign policy in “fits and starts of 
uncertainty and hesitancy in policy development spanning a period of years.”30  
Germany’s actions in each of the above events were controversial (inside and 
outside the Federal Republic) precisely because they came at a time when the 
new Germany was finding its proper place in the post-Cold War world.  Such a 
process is never easy, but by the end of the decade Bundeswehr troops were 
successfully leading NATO efforts in the Balkans, German domestic opinion was 
strongly behind its government’s efforts, and no one was worried about a newly 
sovereign Germany stirring up trouble on the continent.   
Max Otte, also highlighting change in German foreign policy, points to the 
new Schröder government of 1998 and its “new direction in Germany’s policies 
toward Europe.”31  Otte contends that the newly elected Red/Green coalition 
government was prepared to pursue a more assertive role in the area of 
European integration (specifically within EU budgetary matters) and 
contemplated a foreign policy “not burdened by the baggage of the past.”32  Here 
again, the feeling of a newly united unencumbered Germany ready to take its 
rightful place on the world economic and political stage was tempered with the 
reality of international constraints and domestic feelings.  The end result was 
within a few months of taking office, the Schröder government was following a 
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policy that was “almost identical to that of its predecessor government.”33  Such 
behavior leads Otte to comment that although Germany’s foreign policy doctrine 
has changed more radically than many people realize, “the events of 1989-1991 
did not change Germany’s basic security calculus.”  “Germany, now more than 
ever, remains a pillar of the status quo.”34   
In the post-Cold War international system, few countries were as 
profoundly affected by its ensuing international crises and domestic political 
conditions as the Federal Republic of Germany.  The international parameters 
that had guided German foreign policy for forty years suddenly fell away.  While 
the overall international trend was toward fragmentation and disintegration, with 
countries like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia dissolving, Germany grew larger 
with unification.35  But as has been discussed thus far, as Germany’s leaders 
struggled to respond to new challenges in the post-Cold War era, they ultimately 
returned to the same principles and beliefs that had served them well for the 
previous forty years.  So the pressing question becomes why was this the case?  
Why did German foreign policy (except for the areas noted above) remain 
basically unchanged after 1991?  After living under the shadow of the American 
nuclear umbrella for 40 years, why did Germany not use its new found freedom 
of action to begin a more proactive more nationalistic foreign policy?   
 
D. EXPLAINING CONTINUITY: GERMAN INTERNAL-EXTERNAL 
LINKAGES                  
Returning to the internal-external debate discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, the answers to these questions lie in the unique juxtaposition of 
Germany’s internal political-military predispositions and its external strategic 
dilemmas experienced during the decade after unification.  Put simply, the 
continuity in German foreign and security policy after 1991 is the result of two 
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primary factors: first, Germany’s internal political military culture and second, its 
post-1991 external operating environment.  Germany’s current foreign and 
security policy can best be explained by examining the precise nature of these 
two factors and how the one affects the other; or using Hanrieder’s terminology, 
by looking at the “linkage” between the internal security culture and the external 
environment.   
 
1.  Internal Factors  
Turning first to Germany’s political military culture, numerous works have 
been devoted to the general topic of political culture and even more common are 
analyses of strategic culture.  Unfortunately, the concept of political culture has 
rarely been used to explain foreign policy and has usually remained independent 
from the idea of strategic culture.  Pye and Verba define political culture as “the 
system of empirical beliefs, expressed symbols, and the values which affect the 
situation in which political action takes place.”  They contend that for individual 
leaders, “political culture provides the guidelines, controlling guidelines for 
effective political behavior; and for the collectivity, it gives a systematic structure 
of values” that give coherence to foreign policy.36  Despite the lack of literature 
linking political and strategic culture to foreign policy decisions, several 
contemporary studies have linked theses ideas to the transformation of German 
foreign policy.   
Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued that political culture can affect the 
choices of top decision makers: 
…by changing policy goals or how those goals are prioritized, by 
narrowing the range of options and/or means to implement goals, 
or by winning symbolic concessions in the sense of changed 
rhetoric rather than policy reforms.37   
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Also, Thomas Berger stated that “political military culture,” a subset of the larger 
political culture that focuses on security issues and the use of force in 
international affairs, can be linked directly to Germany’s behavior in the past 50 
years.38   
One of the more detailed analyses of how to properly link political and 
strategic culture to Germany’s experience comes from John Duffield.  Duffield 
holds that strategic culture is a subset of political culture where the first isolates 
those components of the second which may be of direct relevance to security 
issues.  These relevant components generally fall into five categories and form 
what he calls “national security culture.”39  First is a nation’s world view which 
includes empirical beliefs about the nature of the external environment, the 
international system, and the nation’s place within it.  Second are the national 
identity, loyalty, and emotional attachments.  How strong is the sense of national 
identity, are there feelings of affinity or aversion toward other states or regional 
entities?  The third category is the national interest.  What are the principal goals 
and values of national security policy and how should they be prioritized?  Fourth 
is the feeling or attitude of uncertainty about the external environment.  
Depending upon the level of uncertainty, different courses of action are likely to 
have differing consequences.  The final category encompasses the shared 
norms and values concerning appropriate political behavior.  Here, as in the 
fourth category, the effect is to rule out certain unethical or illegitimate forms of 
conduct.40    
Applying these ideas and categories to post-Cold War Germany, we find a 
set of predispositions, values, beliefs, and attitudes that were formed over time 
and which have changed little since unification.  The German national security 
culture which evolved over the course of the 20th century was one which, when 
combined with the external environment, yielded a foreign policy of “dependency, 
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solidarity in alliances, need for harmony, multilateralism, moralism, 
delegitimization of power politics, and a forgotten reason of state.”41  According 
to Duffield: 
German society as a whole, and German political elites in 
particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely 
shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially 
great relevance to national security policy, which were little altered 
by unification.42   
 There is no question as to the seminal importance of Germany’s 
experience in the Second World War and the years immediately following, in 
shaping the beliefs and attitudes described by Schwarz and Duffield above.  
Germany’s negative World War II experiences with Nazi dictatorship and 
Wehrmacht excesses, as well as from the far more positive post-war experiences 
(including creating one of the world’s most stable democracies, pulling off the 
Wirtschaftswunder, and the ensuing German integration back into Europe via the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community) all served to 
create the distinctive and widely shared values that are Germany’s national 
security culture.  These experiences were deeply internalized and became 
accepted by a substantial majority of the population, and have been passed on to 
subsequent generations through both formal education and informal socialization 
processes.   
Germany’s experiences in the 20th century shaped its national security 
culture by changing the way in which Germans view their own country’s status 
and proper place in the world, by dramatically redefining the German national 
identity, and by generating strong and relatively clear feelings in Germany for 
anti-militarism and multilateralism.  Before World War II, many Germans 
regarded their country as a great power that merited a substantial role in world 
affairs.  But when Adolf Hitler took this idea to maniacal extremes, attitudes 
changed considerably.  Today most Germans tend to down play their country’s 
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international importance, at least when it comes to security affairs, with the 
dominant view being that Germany should limit its role to Europe.  This attitude 
was plainly stated by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt when he declared in 
1995, “We are not a world power, and we have neither the capability nor the 
desire to be one.”43   
Closely related to the less ambitious post-World War II self-image is the 
dramatic redefinition of the German national identity.  Lead by Hitler’s 
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, the National Socialists twisted and 
brutally corrupted the idea of the German Volk, and as such what it meant to be 
German, to such an extent that it has taken Germans decades to rid themselves 
of this menace and replace this identity with a new less nationalistic, more 
transcendental one.  This redefined national identity has acquired a dominantly 
Western orientation in which Germans see themselves as members of a larger 
European entity, strongly rooted in Western liberal democratic values and 
traditions.  This decidedly European orientation has been described by former 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl as one of the foundations of German political culture.44   
 But the process of redefining its national identity along less nationalistic 
lines has not been easy for Germany.  Along the way, German society has 
become extremely sensitive to any public display of its connection to this most 
infamous period of German history.  Examples include the controversy over the 
exhibition of a collection of World War II photographs staged by the Hamburg 
Institute for Social Research in 1995, or the decision of a Berlin publishing house 
not to publish a book about Nazi pornographic films and photos made during the 
war.45  Lest one not forget the impact of the past upon the German armed forces, 
there is the case of German Special Forces Commander Brigadier General 
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Günzel who was fired for his outward support of a German member of parliament 
who was accused of making anti-Semitic comments in a public speech.46  These 
examples speak to the power of political culture, national identity and the 
German need to exercise mastery over the past—Vergangenheitsbewältigung.    
The final, yet very important, feature of German national security culture is 
the emphasis on anti-militarism and multilateralism.  Taking up first the idea of 
anti-militarism, Harald Müller points out that well before unification took place, 
most Germans exhibited a “reluctance or, depending on the political camp, an 
open refusal to consider military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign 
policy.”47  Since World War II, Germans have tended to see only the 
disadvantages and inefficacy of military action, viewing it as unlikely to be 
effective, risky, and even counterproductive.48  Certainly this was the case during 
the Cold War, when the East German Nationalen Volksarmee and the Soviet 
Red Army were poised just across the border and the exclusive role of the 
Bundeswehr was national self-defense.  But even after unification and the end of 
the Cold War, this highly restrictive view of Germany’s military role has continued 
and has considerable impact upon attempts to reform the Bundeswehr.  Max 
Otte writes: 
During basic training, Bundeswehr recruits, among them this writer, 
were regularly told that the sole mission of the Bundeswehr was a 
political one: to deter an attack.  Many soldiers were convinced that 
if war broke out, it would mean that the Bundeswehr had failed.49   
Additionally, continued anti-militarism since the end of the Cold War has 
manifested itself in the broad concept of security that many Germans have 
espoused.  This new broader concept of security has support from many of the 
leading politicians in Germany, especially in the ruling coalition of the SPD and 
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Green parties, and is best described in the comprehensive security concept 
document published by the SPD in the wake of unification: 
Security can exist only on the basis of political, economic, social, 
and ecological cooperation, that is, as cooperative security leading 
to comprehensive, non-military conflict prevention and resolution, 
so that the military dimension becomes less important.50    
 There is no doubt that in the minds of today’s German leaders, “security is not 
just a military problem.”51     
 Under the heading of multilateralism comes the idea that if an overly 
militarized society contributed to Germany’s past transgressions, then equally to 
blame must be the tendency to use such militarism in a ‘going-it-alone’ or 
Alleningänge.  Acting alone in world security affairs has only gotten Germany in 
trouble.  Therefore, Germans have developed an overwhelming preference for 
acting multilaterally in world affairs.  As one German commentator observed, “the 
burden of the past rules out categorically and forever any idea of Germany going 
it alone…The new Germany’s flexibility for action…is paralyzed by memories of 
the past.”52  Based on the negative experiences from World War II and on the 
good experiences with the allies and NATO during the post-war years, German 
leaders have determined that diplomatic isolation, insecurity and conflict are the 
results of unilateralism, while cooperation, security and peace are the results of 
multilateralism.  During the critical years immediately following the war, strong 
men of character like Adenauer, Acheson, and Schuman showed the world, and 
their own countrymen, that there was an alternative to the Realpolitik that had 
resulted in two wars in the same century, and that the alternative could, in fact, 
yield far more advantages than the sum of its parts would suggest.  Through the 
subsequent vehicles of the European Coal and Steel Community, Adenauer’s 
policy of Westbindung, and finally the European Community (which would 
become the European Union), German leaders learned the value and necessity                                             
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of multilateralism which is forever more a defining characteristic of their political 
and strategic culture.         
 Today, some German leaders could almost be accused of seeing 
multilateralism as an unwritten constitutional principle.53  Since World War II, 
Germany has become the leading proponent for European integration and since 
the end of the Cold War has acted almost exclusively through international or 
multilateral organizations in world affairs (NATO, OSCE, UN, etc.).  This is 
evidenced by the statement of former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to 
the UN General Assembly in 1995:  “the fundamental principle of German foreign 
policy…is to give priority to multilateral cooperation.”54   
  
2.  External Factors 
While the extremely influential effects of a nation’s political military culture 
can go a long way in explaining foreign and security policy, these internal factors 
alone are insufficient.  Domestic factors like strategic culture, political parties, and 
public opinion must be interpreted along side a nation’s external operating 
environment in order to put these beliefs and attitudes into their proper, 
geopolitical context.  Not only have those of the realist school recognized the 
importance of external realities in the making of a nation’s foreign and security 
policy.  Regional or international crises that demand a response from great 
powers may certainly prompt realignment in foreign policy.  Military invasions, 
civil wars, genocide, and humanitarian crises directly relate to a country’s foreign 
and security policy orientation and demand attention, and often prompt political 
debate on a proper response.  It is for these reasons that Jeffrey Lantis calls 
such external shocks “strategic dilemmas.”55  As such, strategic dilemmas (and 
more specifically, Germany’s reaction to them) make up the second factor which 
has determined Germany’s past foreign and security policy, and which also helps 
to account for the continuity seen in its post-Cold War actions.   
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 The Federal Republic was no longer the same political or geographical 
entity after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  In the years that followed the world began 
to undergo incredible political transformation which led to an equally transformed 
geopolitical landscape.  For the newly united Germany, the strategic threats to its 
territory which had guided its foreign and security policy for decades simply 
disappeared, and even more interesting, several former enemies became 
partners via international institutions like NATO, the OSCE, and the EU.  But the 
euphoria of November 1989 was, sadly, short lived.  As one expert observer 
wrote, “the dissolution of the Soviet imperium has brought forth no ‘perpetual 
peace,’ as many had hoped in 1990-1991.”56  Almost continually throughout the 
1990s, Germany was faced with one strategic dilemma after another which 
forced its leaders, military establishment, and the general public to revisit the 
assumptions and norms that had driven German foreign policy for half a century.    
 The Persian Gulf crisis, beginning on 2 August 1990, presented Germany 
with its first strategic dilemma of the decade and could not have occurred at a 
more sensitive time.57  Iraq invaded Kuwait just as the Federal Republic was 
entering into the final phase of negotiations for both the two-plus-four treaty on 
unification, and the bilateral German-Soviet treaty on the withdrawal of all Soviet 
troops from German soil.58  This put German leaders in a very difficult position.  
They obviously considered the invasion itself a blatant violation of international 
law and felt an obligation to support not only the corresponding United Nations 
Security Council resolutions on the matter, but to show support for the United 
States as well.  However, German leaders were also very conscious of Soviet 
and East German sensitivities concerning on-going negotiations and were keen 
not to make any moves which could upset this situation or the first all-German 
national elections scheduled for October 1990.59  Additionally there was the 
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constitutional question of sending Bundeswehr troops outside the traditional 
NATO area of operations.  Key sections of the German Basic Law, Articles 24 
and 87a, implied, according to the standard political interpretation of the Cold 
War, that German military action was limited to participation in regional, collective 
security institutions.60  Most German leaders agreed that these articles of the 
Basic Law essentially barred the government from sending troops to the Persian 
Gulf.  Germany’s difficult position was exacerbated by personal requests for 
German troop deployments to the Persian Gulf by both the US President George 
Bush and US Secretary of State James Baker.61     
 Here one can clearly see the linkage between internal strategic culture 
influences (emphasis on alliance ties, solidarity, and multilateralism) and external 
operating environment considerations (emphasis on hard security threats and 
intentions of neighbors).  One the one hand, Germany had realistic reasons for 
continuing its post-WW II and Cold War military doctrine of purely self-defense 
actions within an alliance context, and on the other hand, the Federal Republic 
was under considerable pressure to play a more active role in the new post-Cold 
War world of peacekeeping and international crisis management efforts.  
Compatibility and consensus had to be found between these two competing 
factors.   
 Given the urgency of the situation, German leaders agreed that they must 
respond in some way to the strategic dilemmas caused by the Iraqi invasion and 
subsequent US requests for material and financial assistance for military 
operations.  Eighteen days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the German 
Chancellor, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense met to discuss the German 
response to the war, which in the words of Foreign Minister Genscher, “fit neither 
the political needs nor the mood of the people.”62  Knowing that the time was not 
right to address the constitutional question of German troop deployment, and 
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recognizing that 70% of the German public opposed direct German involvement, 
these leaders, along with their respective political party leaders, agreed on a 
compromise by mid-September 1990.63  Germany would execute what is known 
as “checkbook diplomacy.”  It was agreed that the Federal Republic would 
provide economic aid to those states most affected by the invasion, logistical and 
financial support for the military coalition aligned against Iraq but they would not 
send German troops to the region.  All told, the German government committed a 
total of $11.5 billion to the coalition effort—about one sixth of the total cost of all 
coalition efforts.64  “This ‘checkbook diplomacy’ met with general approval inside 
Germany,” and reflected the consensus that financial and logistical support 
represented the limits of German actions based on established constitutional 
barriers.65   
 While the CDU/FDP coalition government of Kohl and Genscher was able 
to find suitable compatibility and consensus in order to extricate itself from the 
Persian Gulf crisis, it was certainly only a foreshadowing of the further conflicts of 
the 1990s.  Continued humanitarian crises around the world during this decade 
prompted legal, political, and moral debates in Germany that put the Gulf War 
compromise on the use of force to the test.66  This test came in the form of the 
worsening humanitarian and political situation in the African country of Somalia in 
1992-1993.  The strategic dilemma of Somalia presented the German 
government, once again, with a conflict between its internal predispositions 
toward restraint and purely defensive military action and its external requirements 
to fulfill German responsibilities commensurate with being a mature and reliable 
member of the international system of states.  Chancellor Kohl, along with his 
new Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and new Defense Minister Volker Rühe, were 
ready to accept the greater role offered to Germany by UN Secretary Boutros-
Ghali and US President George Bush by early 1992, but many leading Liberal 
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members of his coalition government, not to mention the German public, were 
not prepared as yet to go along with him.         
 Just as in the Gulf War crisis, German leaders would have to find the 
acceptable range of consensus and compatibility between the newly emerging 
desire for Germany to take on a more leading role in global affairs and the 
traditional foreign policy of the Mittellage—restraint and circumspection.  In this 
sense, the Somalia dilemma and ensuing debate over the constitutionality of 
deploying German troops served as a microcosm of the broader disagreements 
among decision makers and party leaders over the new course of German 
foreign and security policy.67  As in 1991, the main debate centered on differing 
interpretations of Articles 24 and 87a of the Basic Law and its implications for 
Bundeswehr deployments and the use of force.   
 Just as it had during the Persian Gulf crisis, the Kohl government, backed 
by the conservative CDU/CSU party, supported sending Bundeswehr soldiers 
outside the traditional NATO area of responsibility for humanitarian missions and 
held that a constitutional amendment was not necessary.  Some hard-line 
Conservatives even favored German participation in both multinational 
peacekeeping and peace-making operations under UN, NATO, or WEU 
auspices.  Opposing Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister Rühe were the FDP 
(the junior partner in the coalition government) and the SPD.  The FDP, led by 
new Foreign Minister and party leader Klaus Kinkel, supported the overall idea 
that Germany needed to take on a larger role in international security obligations 
(especially in UN sanctioned humanitarian efforts such as Somalia), but held 
firmly to the demand for a constitutional amendment allowing such deployments.  
The SPD believed in a much more narrow interpretation of the constitution and 
stated that any troop deployment to Somalia would be in violation of German 
Basic Law.  A leading SPD party member and Ministerpräsident of Schleswig-
Holstein, Bjorn Engholm, demanded that the government enter into negotiations 
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to amend the Basic Law and promised that the SPD would contest any attempted 
troop deployment by the Kohl government in the Federal Constitutional Court.68  
 These mixed political party positions concerning the Somalia mission and 
the constitutional issue of Bundeswehr deployments were accompanied by 
similarly mixed public opinions.  Most Germans believed that their country should 
act in response to international humanitarian crises like Somalia, but they 
disagreed over the constitutionality of such actions and over the correct use of 
the Bundeswehr in response to them.  In 1993, 95% of Germans said they 
supported some role in humanitarian missions, 53% favored German 
participation in UN peacekeeping missions, but only 18% said that Germany 
should participate in future Gulf War-like operations sanctioned by the UN.69   
 The German government response to the Somalia crisis involved two 
simultaneous tracks.  First, Conservative leaders realized they had to 
acknowledge domestic public and political opposition to any Bundeswehr 
deployment and decided to enter into negotiations with the opposition on 
amending the Basic Law.  Second, Kohl and his cabinet leaders wanted to show 
their resolve to be a responsible member of the international community, and 
therefore moved ahead with plans to deploy about 1,600 Bundeswehr soldiers to 
Somalia as part of the UNOSOM II relief mission.  The first track (agreeing to 
negotiations on amending the Basic Law) was pursued as a political necessity in 
order to keep the CDU-FDP ruling coalition at least outwardly united.  The FDP 
has insisted on talks to amend the constitution before they would lend their 
support to any troop deployments.  In exchange for their willingness to negotiate, 
the Conservatives  obtained valuable concessions from the FDP—the proposed 
amendment would include a clause allowing German participation in future 
peacemaking operations under the UN, NATO, or even the WEU but would 
require a two-thirds majority vote from the Bundestag.70  
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 The opposition (SPD and Green parties) was open to limited Bundeswehr 
deployments for humanitarian missions under UN auspices, but was opposed to 
the government’s broad range of contingencies for Bundeswehr deployments.  
The SPD publicly announced its opposition to the government’s proposed 
amendment in January 1993, and offered their own narrow amendment in the 
Bundestag which did not make it past the first reading due to Conservative 
opposition.71  Among those speaking out against the government’s proposal was 
future German Chancellor, then Ministerpräsident of Lower Saxony, Gerhard 
Schröder.  Schröder felt that the Bundeswehr must be able to conduct 
peacekeeping missions, but that such missions had become too politically 
complicated for Germany.  He said Germany needed time to find a “new identity” 
and solve its own problems after unification, and that the “government would be 
better off if it did not get involved in overseas adventures before the 
Constitutional Court decision.”72      
 Meanwhile, the pace of events in Somalia did not wait for German 
politicians to get their act together, and by April 1993 the UN Secretary General 
was urgently requesting the deployment of German troops to assist in the 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia.73  This very public request brought the 
deployment question to a climax.  Put in the language of internal-external 
linkages, the Kohl government was once again in the position of trying to come 
up with a foreign and security policy that addressed the external realities of 
Germany’s position in the post-Cold War world and the internal political military 
culture that told Germans to stay out of the lime light and to avoid “overseas 
adventures.”74  In this case the government chose to give in to external realities 
and move ahead with troop deployments without a constitutional amendment, but 
in order to appease the opposition and public opinion they made this move 
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through the Bundestag in the form of a request for parliamentary approval of 
German troop deployments to Somalia.  On April 21, 1993, the cabinet leaders 
launched a public relations campaign to ensure the request received the best 
possible chance in the Bundestag.  Foreign Minister Kinkel pledged that the 
troops would be deployed “in a pacified area,” and serve “purely humanitarian 
purposes.”  He added, “German foreign policy has always been, and remains, a 
policy of peace.”75  The initiative received a majority of support from the 
Bundestag despite the SPD and Green parties voting against the authorization 
and pledging to challenge the initiative in the Federal Constitutional Court.76   
 At first it seemed as if the government had made the right choice.  By late 
summer 1993, 1,700 German soldiers were committed to UNOSOM II and were 
engaged in a wide variety of tasks.  Bundeswehr soldiers themselves felt good 
about making significant contributions to the war-torn country, and their work had 
earned Germany a “particularly high reputation” for participation in the 
humanitarian relief effort.77  Even the talk of a constitutional amendment died 
down for the moment.  But by October things in Somalia had taken a turn for the 
worse as three main events transpired to lead the German government to rethink 
the wisdom of the entire deployment.  The first negative development was the 
age-old problem of “mission creep.”  What had began as a purely humanitarian 
relief effort had quickly become an operation to “assume responsibility for the 
consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout 
Somalia.”  This mandate from the UN Security Council authorized forces there to 
seize weapons caches of the various warring clans, resulting in UN actions being 
perceived as taking sides with one clan against the others—the most dangerous 
situation peacekeepers can find themselves in.  Ambushes and attacks on UN 
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convoys and peacekeepers became more frequent and claimed the lives of 46 
UN soldiers between June and September 1993.78    
 The second and third costly events occurred with in two weeks of each 
other and combined to become the main catalyst behind German reevaluation of 
its commitment.  On October 3, 1993, US soldiers launched a daring daylight raid 
into downtown Mogadishu to capture top generals from the Aideed clan.  The 
resulting tragedy, where a day-long firefight through the streets of Mogadishu left 
18 American soldiers dead and 75 wounded, has since then become the poster 
child for how humanitarian interventions can go disastrously wrong.79  The 
immediate effect upon the Somalia mission was an announcement only 48 hours 
later by US President Bill Clinton of America’s decision to withdraw all US forces 
from Somalia by March 1994.80  This of course was a major blow to the other 16 
countries participating in the operation and was followed two weeks later by the 
first ever killing of a German soldier on a UN peacekeeping mission.  Although 
Medical Staff Sergeant Alexander Arndt was shot in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by 
an unknown assailant, the death received widespread media attention and had 
obvious implications for German political leaders in relation to the Somalia 
operation.81   
 These three events, and the subsequent outcry from the opposition and 
general public, put the Kohl government under tremendous pressure to rethink its 
original decision to allow external forces to guide their policy, and now found 
itself having to give in to internal domestic forces.  Throughout October and early 
November 1993, SPD and Green party leaders called for the immediate 
withdrawal of German troops from Somalia and even the junior party in the 
governing coalition (the FDP) moderated its position to say that German troops 
should be recalled if new fighting erupted in the area where they were 
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stationed.82  By late November, the question was no longer whether soldiers 
should be withdrawn from Somalia but when and how.  After discussions with US 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, it was clear that German troop withdrawals via 
the Mogadishu airport could be protected by US forces until March 31, 1994 but 
not a day longer.83  Shortly before Christmas 1993, the German government 
announced that Bundeswehr troops would be removed from Somalia by the end 
of March.84  But despite the gloomy atmosphere surrounding the entire Somalia 
operation and its unfortunate and abrupt end, German leaders like Defense 
Minister Rühe saw the UNOSOM II mission as a profound and meaningful step 
for German foreign policy and in Germany’s path toward a more leading role in 
international security affairs.  His comments to returning Bundeswehr soldiers in 
March 1994 would have a strong influence on the future development of German 
responses to humanitarian crises: 
Everything we did in Somalia was for humanitarian good.  Your 
operation in Somalia was an investment in humanity, and also in 
the future of the Bundeswehr.  Germany has proven its capabilities 
to be a responsible member of broader society.  We are prepared 
for growing responsibilities in the world…85 
 Although the Persian Gulf crisis and the Somalia episode were crucial first 
steps for Germany in the post-Cold War era, arguably the most serious strategic 
dilemmas facing the Federal Republic during the 1990s were the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia.  German leaders and politicians had gained valuable 
experience during the first two strategic dilemmas in learning how to balance 
external responsibilities and pressures with internal demands and influences.  
Their actions in response to the Persian Gulf and Somalia operations were 
experiments in finding an acceptable range of compatibility with the existing 
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international system and consensus among domestic political forces, in order to 
meld a coherent foreign and security policy.  Many of these same leaders and 
politicians found themselves relying on these previous experiences when they 
once again struggled to restructure German foreign policy during the Bosnia 
crisis of 1994-1999.  Although not without its share of differences, this time 
German officials were able to build a surprisingly strong political consensus for 
action in Bosnia over a four year period.  As in the first two dilemmas, the story of 
Germany’s political and policy actions during the Bosnia crisis confirms the 
importance of internal-external linkages in forming foreign policy and 
underscores once again the influence of political military culture on a nation’s 
policy decisions.   
 As in the previous dilemmas, the vehicle for policy debate on the Bosnia 
crisis was the constitutionality of Bundeswehr troop deployments—this time the 
technical issue was German participation in UN and NATO military actions in the 
former Yugoslavia.  By the time hearings began in April 1994, the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe had three past petitions concerning the out-of-
area troop deployment issue to use as the basis for its decision: the July 1992 
challenge by the SPD on the commitment of troops to the NATO-WEU naval 
embargo in the Adriatic; the SPD case against Bundeswehr deployments to 
Somalia in late 1992; and the SPD-FDP challenge of February 1993 over 
German involvement in AWACS monitoring missions over the Balkans.86  Four 
months later, in July 1994, the Constitutional Court made its ruling in favor of the 
Kohl government’s position.  The court held that Article 24 of the Basic Law 
offered the best guidance on the out-of-area question and that German 
participation in international military operations outside NATO territory did not 
violate the constitution.87  It ruled that the three previous deployments of German 
soldiers out-of-area mentioned above had not violated the constitution, and said 
that the Basic Law offered “a constitutional foundation for an assumption of 
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responsibilities that are typically associated with membership of such a system of 
collective security.”  Finally, the court ruled that the Bundeswehr could be 
deployed in “potential combat environments” so long as the government secured 
a simple majority vote of approval from the Bundestag.88  
  
The Constitutional Court ruling of July 1994 freed Germany from 
constitutionally mandated military abstention, but it raised a political 
dilemma at the same time.  Although German troops are cleared to 
join international peace mission, the legal ruling does not 
necessarily translate into wider political and popular support in 
Germany for sending soldiers abroad.89   
This analysis of the court decision by Franz-Josef Meiers could not have been 
more correct.  As Meiers goes on to point out, “The irony of the Karlsruhe 
decisions is that it has been greeted with far more caution within Germany—on 
both sides of the political spectrum—than among Germany’s allies.”90  Despite 
their public praise and optimism about the court ruling, Chancellor Kohl and 
Foreign Minister Kinkel were more cautious when discussing the potential for 
Bundeswehr deployments to the Balkan crisis.  Kinkel concluded, “I think that a 
mission of German soldiers in the former Yugoslavia will not find a majority 
because of the historical situation…”91  Even the more activist Defense Minister, 
Volker Rühe, showed uncharacteristic restraint when asked about the Bosnia 
question, saying Germany wanted to be part of the solution, not part of the 
problem (referring to the same historical connection as Kinkel).92     
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 Considering such less than enthusiastic comments about Germany’s 
willingness to flex its newfound muscle into the emerging Bosnia crisis, it is not 
surprising that the German government simply ignored the first request for 
German ECR-Tornado aircraft support to Bosnia from NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, US General George Joulwan in November 1994.  This 
unusual maneuver on the part of the Kohl government reflects just how ill-
prepared they were to define German foreign and security policy in the wake of 
the Karlsruhe decision.93  One government official rationalized the none-
response to NATO by saying General Joulwan had not sent the request through 
proper official channels and therefore it was not considered for formal action by 
the government.94       
 The following month, December 1994, Joulwan made another request for 
German ECR-Tornado aircraft, this time via more formal channels making it 
impossible for the government to ignore.  Looking for firm consensus among his 
coalition partners, the FDP, and knowing there were differing opinions among the 
opposition SPD, Kohl talked around the issue publicly until the December 20th 
cabinet meeting, at which the deployment issue was on the agenda.95  As in the 
Somalia decision, the FDP and Kinkel decided to support the CDU/CSU position 
to send the requested aircraft citing the moral responsibility to support the NATO 
humanitarian relief flights over the coming winter.96  This humanitarian rationale 
seemed to win over the opposition as well.  Shortly after the cabinet decision, 
and just before the issue moved to the Bundestag for a vote, SPD Chairman 
Rudolf Scharping said his party would also support the deployment of aircraft to 
protect relief flights.97  The vote in the Bundestag received a majority approval, 
including a larger than expected number of SPD votes in favor.   
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 The German government felt it had lived up to their UN and NATO 
responsibility with the December vote, and was now able to see some favorable 
movement from the opposition SPD toward a more proactive stance in foreign 
and security affairs.  But it did not take long for the situation on the ground in 
Bosnia to worsen and prompt yet another request for German support from the 
UN and NATO in May 1995.  As discussions about Germany’s role in the newly 
created UN-NATO Rapid Reaction Force continued (put together in order to 
rescue UN peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia if needed)98, the German 
domestic political and public trend of supporting humanitarian interventions 
began to grow.  Helped along by mass media coverage of the genocide and 
severe suffering of the Bosnian people99, a rather broad base of support for 
German intervention began to develop among the population, the German 
cabinet, and to a certain extent among both the SPD and Green parties.  Notably 
for the Green party was the policy paper circulated by a member of the party 
board of directors, Joschka Fischer, calling for a more active German 
government role in promoting UN humanitarian and peace operations in the 
Balkans.100   
 Although this growing feeling was guarded within all camps and was 
based on the condition that German forces not engage in combat (other than 
self-defense), it was enough to lead to a German commitment of support to the 
Rapid Reaction Force.  In June 1995, the cabinet agreed on a support plan and 
forwarded the matter to the Bundestag for review.  The plan called for the 
participation of approximately 1,500 Bundeswehr troops, including medical, 
logistical, and security personnel, as well as Tornado and transport aircraft 
support.  The cost would be an estimated $240 million to the German 
government.101  After two days of strong debate, and a firm stipulation that 
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German planes could only “protect and assist the UN Rapid Reaction Force 
when attacked,”102 the measure passed the Bundestag by a strong majority (386 
to 258) on June 30, 1995.103                     
 Despite receiving a clear majority vote in the Bundestag, many members 
of the opposition and members of the general public had grave reservations 
about Germany’s new willingness to send armed forces abroad.  But the June 
30, 1995 decision was historic and, as stated by Chancellor Kohl, “a major 
turning point in foreign and defense policy.”  While fortunately the Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF) plan was never fully implemented, Germany did provide increasing 
amounts of support to operations in the Balkans, including German ECR-
Tornadoes participating in their first air strikes on Bosnian Serb military positions 
as part of a NATO operation on September 1, 1995.  Although these flights were 
reconnaissance missions and did not drop ordinance, it was considered the 
country’s first combat mission since World War II.104  In many respects, the 
decision to support the RRF was the first step in process of what some have 
called the normalization of German foreign and defense policy.  The events of 
1991-1995 had enabled the government to gradually consolidate support for an 
“entirely new security policy construct,” one which permitted out-of-area 
operations and lead to the Bundeswehr’s sizable participation (4,000 soldiers) in 
NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) later that year, and an in the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) in 1996.105         
 
E. SUMMARY 
 This chapter has provided vivid evidence, in the form of the three strategic 
dilemmas examined, of the importance of both domestic constraints and external 
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pressures on the development of German foreign and security policy.  It has 
highlighted the pivotal role of international crises as catalysts for German foreign 
and security policy change, and it has proven how domestic political conditions 
and constraints shape policy decisions.  This linkage is the key to understanding 
Germany’s evolution in foreign and defense policy since the end of the Cold War, 
and to understanding why Germany has continued to exhibit continuity and 
restraint in its actions.  Such a model of external-internal linkages has proven 
extremely useful in understanding decision making inside the Federal Republic 
since 1991, and will likely be of continued usefulness in the future.   
 But in addition to proving the value of the linkages model, this chapter has 
also said something about the specific nature of German strategic culture and its 
impact upon the nature of German post-Cold War actions.  The evolution of 
German security and defense policy is a testament to a successful “pattern of 
making-strategy-in-a-democracy which has been visible since the beginning of 
the republic in 1949.”106  Along the way Germans have acquired a distinctive set 
of values and beliefs about how a democratic nation should conduct defense and 
foreign policy which has served them well.  This set of values and beliefs, better 
known as political military culture, has successfully guided the Federal Republic 
through the strategic dilemmas described in this chapter and will continue to do 
so in the future.  It has been and will be successful because German political 
military culture promotes multilateral cooperation, values international security 
organizations, and seems to recognize the nexus between international events 
and domestic political exigencies.  For Germany, this nexus has often involved 
discussions about the use of its armed forces and the government’s doctrine on 
the use of force.  In each of the case studies examined here, the Bundeswehr 
figured prominently in the course of German foreign policy and continues to do 
so today, as evidenced by the current debate over the transformation and future 
of the German armed forces.  Therefore, it is to that subject the next chapter will 
turn.   
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III. GERMAN MILITARY AND DEFENSE REFORMS 
Transformation and reform are certainly not new topics for the German 
military establishment.  Ever since the days of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who 
were responsible for the fundamental reforms in the Prussian Army of the early 
1800s, reform has been a central theme in the German armed forces.107  The 
subsequent Reichswehr and Wehrmacht periods of German military history each 
saw their share of transformation and reform as well, although the results of 
which are not at all viewed as positively as those of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.  
The efforts of Hans von Seeckt108 to transform the small post-World War I 
Reichswehr into a large efficient military and political power did so without regard 
to the Versailles Treaty and with his own warped sense of civil-military relations.  
Then there are the even more negatively viewed actions of army leaders such as 
von Blomberg, von Reichenau, and Keitel, all of whom are now viewed as having 
a hand in allowing the Wehrmacht to become nothing more than Adolf Hitler’s 
personal army during World War II.109  In fact, it is the indelible images of these 
past events in Germany military history, positive and negative, that have 
contributed to the German strategic culture of today.   
But in contrast to these images of the past, the creation of the 
Bundeswehr in 1956 opened a new chapter in Germany’s already voluminous 
military history.  This time the German armed forces (the Bundeswehr) were born 
of and inside the alliance structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and were created not for the sake of the Federal Republic; rather for the 
sake of the West.110  Therefore, its periodic reforms mirrored the major changes 
in Allied strategy which took place throughout the Cold War.  NATO policies such 
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as Forward Defense, Flexible Response, and Dual Track Strategy all required, 
and were followed by, at least some degree of Bundeswehr reform.  But arguably 
the time of greatest Bundeswehr reform since its creation began after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and continues in the uncertain security environment of today.  
Today as in the past, a detailed examination of these reforms, and the pattern 
discerned in them, is warranted for three very compelling reasons.  First, and 
especially in the case of Germany, a close look at the nature and scope of reform 
efforts can reveal a great deal about the relative impact of outside forces (such 
as NATO, the EU, and neighboring countries) upon German defense decisions.  
Second, it is mainly through a nation’s military and defense apparatus that its 
strategic and political culture is made manifest for the world to see.  Third, the 
relative success or failure of a nation to execute its planned reforms determines 
the amount of credibility accompanying that nation’s professed security and 
defense policies.  In realist terms, a nation’s policy is only as good as its ability to 
carry it out. 
But the difference between the Bundeswehr of today and the Prussian 
Army, the Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht of the past, is that the current attempts 
at Bundeswehr reform are being carried out inside the unique political and 
security culture of post-Cold War Germany as described in the previous chapter.  
Therefore, not only is the Bundeswehr influenced by such material factors as 
budget constraints, equipment modernization needs, and personnel numbers; but 
it is also heavily influenced by the negative legacy of the past-- the result of 
which has made Germans skeptical of military power and downright fearful of 
military influence inside their own government.  Additionally, the latest series of 
Bundeswehr reforms are the most far reaching and fundamental in the 
organization’s almost 50 year history.  These reforms go to the very definition of 
the Bundeswehr, its purpose for existing, and tasks it must perform.  
 The monumental changes in Europe during the early 1990s, beginning 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification in 1989 and ending with the 
break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, forced a drastic and fundamental change in 
the defense and security thinking of virtually every country in Europe and North 
41 
America.  Perhaps nowhere else was the impact of these events felt more 
strongly than in Germany, a country that had been internally divided and on the 
front line of the Cold War for 48 years.  Yet now, almost overnight, Germany was 
no longer divided, no longer faced the immediate threat of an armed invasion, 
and found itself needing to reduce military levels instead of increasing them.  But 
German leaders were not afraid to tackle the issues confronting them as a result 
of these events.  Almost from the moment that the first East German walked 
through the Brandenburg Gate from East to West Berlin on the night of 9 
November 1989, the German Ministry of Defense has continually and 
systematically attempted to transform the German Armed Forces into a smaller, 
lighter, more capable and more technologically advanced force ready to meet the 
challenges of the new security environment.  It is against this back drop, and with 
an appreciation for the political and cultural influences previously outlined, that 
this chapter examines the series of transformation efforts of the Bundeswehr 
since 1990.   
   
A. “ARMEE DER EINHEIT” 1989-1992 
The first series of post-Cold War German defense reforms were executed 
immediately following German unification, and reflect the mandated changes 
required by the German Unification Treaty of July 1990 which was set in force on 
3 October of that same year.  These first reforms were seen as a major part of 
the interrelated processes of German unification and Bundeswehr reform, with 
the main goals being the dissolution of the former East German National 
People’s Army (NPA) and the creation of what was called der Armee der Einheit 
(Army of Unity).  The simultaneous integration of the NPA into the Bundeswehr 
and the required corresponding restructuring of the new Bundeswehr to meet 
treaty limits was, to say the least, a monumental human and organizational 
challenge.  Almost overnight, former adversaries had to jointly assume 
responsibility for the same tasks: to protect the united democratic Germany and 
its allies, and to build up the Bundeswehr in the new Länder (former East 
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Germany).111  Upon unification, there could only be one army in Germany, under 
the command of the Federal Minister of Defense as the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr).  The East German Ministry of Disarmament 
and Defense was dissolved, and the NPA units were disbanded step by step as 
new Bundeswehr units were raised comprising personnel from the Bundeswehr 
and the former NPA.  The major tasks facing German leaders during this historic 
era were: 
• Define the new role and mission of the Bundeswehr 
• Adapt the German Armed Forces’ capabilities to the new mission 
• Integrate the new legal agreements associated with reunification (such 
as the Two-plus-Four Treaty and the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty) 
• Cope with the overwhelming costs associated with reunification 
• Disband the East German National People’s Army and properly 
dispose of its surplus armaments and equipment  
 
In the three months between the signing of the Unification Treaty in July 
and its effective date in October, an entirely new regional Federal Armed Forces 
command (Eastern Command) was temporarily created in the Berlin suburb of 
Strausberg.  Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg chose Lieutenant General 
Jörg Schönbohm to head this historic effort, and on 3 October 1990 (on day after 
the NPA was officially dissolved) he and 2,000 officers and noncommissioned 
officers of the Bundeswehr activated the Eastern Command of the Bundeswehr.  
Schönbohm and his unit were tasked with: 
•  Exercising command and control over the land, air and naval forces 
 existing in the new Länder at the time 
• Disbanding the agencies and units that did not fit into the future 
force structure 
• Taking over and ensuring the safekeeping of the NPA material 
pending further use, destruction or any other form of disposal 
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• Establishing the envisaged decentralized command and control 
organization 
• Supporting the withdrawal of Soviet forces112 
 
Of these five daunting tasks, the two that occupied the preponderance of 
Eastern Command’s time were the integration of the NPA into the Bundeswehr 
and the dismantling and disposal of East German arms and equipment.  As of 
October 1990, there were approximately 90,000 former NPA soldiers and 48,000 
former NPA civilian employees on the payroll, as well as approximately 2,285 
East German military facilities such as barracks, storage areas, and training 
areas to be safeguarded and controlled.  By the end of 1990, about 13,000 
officers and 9,000 noncommissioned officers of the NPA had left the armed 
forces at their own request.  Of those remaining, approximately 12,000 officers, 
12,000 NCOs and 1,000 enlisted personnel applied for employment in the 
Bundeswehr as regular or temporary-career volunteers with an extended term of 
enlistment.113   
Schönbohm understood the sensitivity and implications of his task to 
integrate the soldiers and civilians of East Germany into the Federal Republic, as 
evidenced by his very prudent remark, “We come not as confirmed winners, but 
as Germans to Germans.”114  In accordance with the Unification Treaty, a 
“Suitability Test Board” was established by Eastern Command in order to 
determine the suitability for applicant officers to become regulars in the 
Bundeswehr.  After screening, a total of 3,027 officers, 7,639 NCOs and 207 
enlisted personnel were selected for continuing employment with extended terms 
of enlistment in the Bundeswehr.  Additionally, extensive retraining and 
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continuation training schemes in civilian professions were offered for servicemen 
leaving the former NPA.115   
Of the 48,000 civilian employees of the former NPA, all of them were 
taken over by the Bundeswehr and reallocated to the services of the Bundeswehr 
and the Federal Defense Administration.  Giving these personnel priority 
treatment when it came to filling civilian posts, combined with the requirement 
under Article 20 of the Unification Treaty to entrust public responsibilities to 
professional civil servants as soon as possible, meant that virtually all the civilian 
personnel were able to retain their jobs in one capacity or another.  In similar 
fashion to the Suitability Test Board, special boards determined whether the 
candidates became professional civil servants or whether they had the 
qualifications for some other career.116     
But this transformation and integration did not come without high financial 
costs.  On 12 October 1990, the newly united Germany and the Soviet Union 
signed the Treaty on the Terms of the Temporary Presence and Arrangements 
for the Planned Withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from the Territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.  This treaty covered all conceivable aspects of the 
transition of East Germany and was as detailed as its name implies.  The treaty 
called for 90 percent (approximately 340,000 troops) of Soviet forces to be 
withdrawn from East Germany by the end of 1993, at a cost of 12 billion Deutsch 
Marks to the Federal Republic, spread out over four years.  This included 3 billion 
for withdrawal, 7.8 billion for construction of housing, 200 million for retraining 
measures, and an interest-free loan of 3 billion to the Soviet Union.117      
Then in December 1992, the Joint Declaration signed by Germany and the 
Soviet Union promised an additional 550 million Deutsch Marks for the 
reintegration and withdrawal of troops.  On top of these figures came the cost of 
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dismantling NPA weapon systems, the renovation of some 600 former East 
German military facilities to be used by the Bundeswehr, and the environmental 
clean up of former East German training areas.  These costs totaled 
approximately 21.8 billion Deutsch Marks just in the first three years alone.118  
With these kinds of numbers involved (and not all costs are discussed here), it is 
not difficult to see how the enormous costs associated with German unification 
came to be, and still is today, an economic and political hot-button issue within 
Germany.   
The fateful decision of the Kohl government not to raise taxes to finance 
the cost of unification had far reaching repercussions which were felt in virtually 
every cabinet office of the Federal Government, not the least of which was the 
Ministry of Defense.119  But during those first few critical years after unification, 
the euphoria of winning the Cold War, regaining national sovereignty and seeing 
the removal of the last major military threat to German territory, all combined to 
produce the expectation of what came to be called the ‘peace dividend.’  The 
logic was, quite understandably at the time, that the new and improved security 
environment would allow all major countries to come off of their Cold War footing, 
reduce military spending and force levels, and still maintain security.  
While Germany was by no means the only European country to think this 
way in the early 1990s, it was certainly more tempting for Germans to adopt this 
line since they alone had to bear the added costs of unification, which by 1995 
had resulted in a total public debt of approximately DM 2 trillion or 50% of 
Germany’s gross domestic product.120  Indeed, the immediate decline in defense 
spending in 1992-93 began a slide that did not stop until 2002.  With only a slight 
exception in 1999, Germany has cut its overall defense spending from 1992 to 
2002 by an average of nearly 10 percent.  In real terms, Germany’s defense 
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budget went from approximately 27 billion Euros in 1991 down to 24.1 billion 
Euros for 2002.121    
This altered world also brought structural changes to the Bundeswehr that 
have continued in a step-wise regression over the last 13 years. In terms of 
personnel and material, the vast majority of the early cuts were mandated under 
the various treaties associated with the end of the Cold War.  The CFE Treaty 
called for an approximate 53% reduction in the amount of weapons and 
armaments belonging to unified Germany and a reduction of approximately 
80,000 personnel, giving the Bundeswehr a total strength of about 340,000 in 
1995.122  But the cuts did not stop once treaty limits were reached.  As will be 
discussed below, pressure to cash in on the ‘peace dividend’ and growing 
financial concerns continue to force subsequent cuts to Germany’s armed forces 
through to the present day. 
   
B. 1992 REFORMS 
The tendency to reduce the armed forces in both personnel and material 
can be viewed as a logical response to the situation facing Europe in the 1990s, 
and quite frankly, for both strategic and financial reasons cuts had to be made.  
However, the great difficulty comes in the face of an unrealized ‘peace dividend’ 
and the resulting increase in failed states, ethnic violence, and humanitarian 
crises around the world.  The reality of the new post-Cold War security 
environment did not mesh with the ‘peace dividend’ theory.  Already by 1992, this 
reality was beginning to sink into the minds of those in the defense ministry.  The 
1992 Defense Policy Guidelines published by the Germany Ministry of Defense, 
recognized that the new post-Cold War world is not necessarily a safer world, 
and was one of the first attempts by the German government to outline the new 
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security situation facing the country, as well as to address the probable impact 
upon the armed forces (the Bundeswehr).   
Closely related to what Americans call National Security Strategy, the 
November 1992 DPG (Defense Policy Guidelines) was a very astutely written 
document considering the amount of flux and confusion in the world at that time.  
It outlined Germany’s national security interests, addressed the challenges of the 
future in a chapter called “Opportunities and Risks,” and described the tasks and 
responsibilities of the new post-Cold War Bundeswehr.123  The 1992 DPG 
reflected the uncertainty of the times in which it was written, and its language 
was clearly influenced by the now firmly rooted German strategic and political 
culture.  On the one hand, it proudly stated that, “For Germany, the existential 
threat of the Cold War has been irreversibly overcome.”  But on the other hand, it 
warned that social, ethnic, religious, and environmental crisis and conflict in 
Europe is still possible, and such conflict could “quickly appear and escalate 
regionally.”124  It also contained a paradox reflective of both German strategic 
culture and the reality of world events; namely that the document listed “Equal 
partnership between Europe and North America…” as one of Germany’s main 
security interests; yet in the previous section it recognized that “German interests 
will not always coincide in every detail with those of the Allies and other 
partners…”  This is a clear reference to the 1991 Gulf War in which Germany did 
not see eye to eye with the United States.   
Here one can plainly see the often times conflicting influence of German 
strategic culture on national security policy.  On one side, the 1992 DPG is filled 
with references to the Allies and partners; frequently mentions the need for more 
cooperation and integration; and clearly admits that the USA is essential to 
German and European security.  Such language is evidence of the strong 
German desire to always seek multilateral solutions and to remain loyal to one’s 
allies.  However, an equally strong cultural principal is the belief that armed 
conflict and war should be absolutely the last resort, and then only undertaken 
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under the proviso of the appropriate international security organization.  In the 
case of the 1991 Gulf War, these two areas of German strategic culture came in 
conflict with one another.  The fact that the UN Security Council sanctioned 
coalition actions against Iraq, and the fact that the USA is one of Germany’s most 
important allies made German support for the Gulf War a virtual requirement.  As 
the Kohl government put it, there can be no compromise with the principles of 
international law.125   
But this loyalty came into conflict with the cultural belief that every non-
military option must be exhausted before military force is used, as is evidenced in 
the 1992 DPG passage concerning German interests not always completely 
coinciding with those of the Allies.  In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, Germany 
felt all diplomatic means had not been exhausted to force an Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait.  In fact, the German Foreign Minister at the time argued right up to 
the last minute that war was not inevitable and that diplomacy should be given 
another chance.126  In the end, Germany found a compromise between the two 
sides and made very significant but low-key contributions to the UN sanctioned 
effort against Iraq.  Germany covered almost 10% of the total expenditure arising 
from the international response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and more than 12% 
of the military expenses incurred by the United States, levels of assistance that 
were exceeded only by those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.127  This issue 
of an apparent conflict between two related but in reality different aspects of 
German national security culture was to only get more pronounced and complex 
in the coming years.     
How Germany dealt with allied security issues was not the only difficult 
issue addressed in the 1992 DPG.  No longer faced with the threat of an East 
German or Soviet invasion, Germany was now free to contemplate the 
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Bundeswehr’s role in foreign and security policy and how it would come to grips 
with the ever increasing demand for Bundeswehr deployments outside of 
German territory.  This meant dealing with two major forces that were often times 
at odds with each other.  On one side was the domestic pressure coming from 
key political parties such as the social democrats, the free democrats, and the 
Green party to realize the ‘peace dividends’ of the end of the Cold War, and to 
reduce the size of the armed forces while cutting defense spending.  On the 
other side were the external pressures coming from NATO (especially the US), 
the UN, and the European Union to take on a greater role in responding to the 
increasingly uncertain and dangerous post-Cold War world of failed states, 
terrorism, and non-state actors.  The difficulty of this issue was not lost on the 
Ministry of Defense and Bundeswehr leaders.  In 1991 the future German 
Defense Minister (who was currently the General Secretary for the Christian 
Democratic party) Volker Rühe acknowledged, “the Gulf War casts a bright light 
on the need to redefine united Germany’s international role, particularly insofar 
as our readiness to commit our forces beyond the NATO area is concerned.”128  
For their part, they knew the Bundeswehr needed more modern agile forces that 
could deploy outside of the immediate area, and they knew there was precious 
little money for it.   
To that end, Germany’s new Defense Minister Volker Rühe gave the 
Bundestag (the German parliament) a clear example of where he would take the 
new Bundeswehr in his speech to that body in September 1992;  
Our allies expect us to show the same solidarity that we were 
shown every day for decades in the face of an acute and existential 
threat…[Thus] in the future, Germany must be ready to defend the 
alliance and other nations in the alliance area—just as others were 
ready to do for Germany for 40 years.129  
 But this would prove to be a tough sell in some to some areas of the German 
body politic.  By far Rühe’s primary and most difficult task was to redefine the 
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missions of Germany’s armed forces, taking into account the fundamentally 
altered geopolitical circumstances, and then to restructure the Bundeswehr so as 
to best carry out its redefined missions in a way that was acceptable to the 
German government and the German people.  The language of Rühe’s 1992 
Defense Policy Guidelines reflects his attempt to carry out the needed 
transformation of the German armed forces, but to do so in a way that was still 
firmly grounded in the principles of German national security culture.   
 In redefining the missions of the Bundeswehr, Rühe’s Ministry of Defense 
still conceived of the Bundeswehr primarily as an alliance army, not an 
instrument for independent military action by the Federal Republic.  Accordingly, 
the 1992 DPG stated that the defense of Germany will always mean defense 
within the context of its allies, especially NATO.  It acknowledged that the, “long-
term effects of the change in the world security environment are not yet fully 
known,” and for this reason the number one task for the Bundeswehr is still, “to 
protect Germany and its citizens from external danger and oppression.”130  
However, the underlying context of this language included the idea that Germany 
must be able to protect its allies wherever they might be located, and introduced 
the term “extended national defense.”  This idea was clearly recognition of the 
recent pressures Germany had felt from the UN and NATO during the 1991 Gulf 
War, and the growing concern for the situation in the former Soviet Republics of 
Eastern Europe. Accordingly, two additional tasks of the Bundeswehr were to 
promote military stability and integration of Europe, and to serve world peace and 
international security as charged by the United Nations charter.131  The 
document also opened Germany up to the growing realization that, “Europe must 
develop the capability to be a shaping power and global actor,” and as such, “A 
part of the German armed forces must be able to execute deployments outside of 
Germany.”132  Rühe argued that the ability to carry out these new missions were 
vital to Germany’s ability to be part of an alliance (Bündnisfähigkeit), which was 
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equally essential to its security, and moreover, that the maintenance of adequate 
armed forces was regarded as an important determinant of Germany’s ability to 
exert influence.133   
 In order to best carry out these new missions, and in response to the 
reality of a shrinking defense budget, the Bundeswehr had to be reduced in both 
size and structure.  As has already been addressed, after unification and in 
accordance with the CFE Treaty the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr fell 
to 340,000 personnel by 1994-95.  This constituted an almost two-thirds cut from 
its Cold War size, and a cut in wartime strength following mobilization of 
approximately one-half.  Overall, these reductions were seen simply as a 
pragmatic reaction to the reduced threat picture, and the need to cut costs in light 
of the enormous financial obligations to the new Länder (former East Germany). 
But unfortunately, since personnel costs in a conscript army are virtually fixed, 
and because the Ministry of Defense did not want readiness standards to slip too 
far, the personnel reductions did not really save Germany much money.  Instead, 
the majority of the needed savings were taken out of the investment share of the 
defense budget, which includes research, development, procurement, and 
infrastructure.  In the end, efforts to further reduce the armed forces down to 
around 300,000 were successfully resisted by using the argument that further 
reductions would not allow the Bundeswehr to accommodate all of the available 
conscripts (otherwise questions of equity in the draft would arise).  Incidentally, in 
an effort to meet the final reduced end strength in an equitable manner, the 
duration of compulsory military service was reduced from 12 to 10 months in 
1994.   
 In addition to being reduced in size, the Bundeswehr was fundamentally 
restructured in the 1992 Policy Guidelines, a far more radical and controversial 
issue than simply overall force reductions.  The plan called for the entire armed 
forces to be restructured into two main components: the main defense forces 
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(Hauptverteidigungskräfte or HVK) which were intended primarily for national 
defense and would require significant mobilization to be combat ready; and the 
smaller crisis reaction forces (Krisenreaktionskräfte or KRK) which were to be 
used for the full spectrum of alliance defense, crisis management, and 
international peace missions.  This restructuring was in line with the latest NATO 
doctrine and the new 1991 Strategic Concept.  The KRK would consist of about 
50,000 troops from all three services, 75-80% of which would be professional 
soldiers, and be fully ready and quickly deployable outside Germany.  The HVK 
would make up the remainder of the armed forces, but would be subdivided into 
units at varying levels of readiness, some being allowed to defer operational 
readiness and some consisting only mainly of cadre, in order to save money. 134   
 This marked a quite significant change from the way the Bundeswehr had 
been organized during the Cold War.  In the 1980s, the German Field Army of 12 
divisions and 36 fully manned combat brigades was poised to repel a Warsaw 
Pact invasion on short notice.  Additionally, there was the Territorial Army (TA) of 
12 brigades which were partially manned or served as equipment holding units in 
peacetime, but would be fully mobilized in case of combat.  Under the 1992 plan, 
the Field Army and Territorial Army were to be consolidated, with the number of 
divisions cut from 12 to 8 and the total number of brigades cut from 48 to 28.  
Seven of these brigades (three mechanized, two airborne, one mountain, and the 
German portion of the Franco-German brigade) would be fully manned and 
constitute the army’s contribution to the KRK.  Similarly drastic cuts were made 
to the air force and the navy.  The air force would go from 620 combat aircraft in 
28 squadrons to less than 500 aircraft in 20 squadrons.  The navy would lose 
almost 50% of its vessels, leaving a total of 80 or 90, but the number of 
destroyers and frigates would remain roughly the same.  Six of the remaining air 
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force squadrons and approximately 40% of the remaining navy would be 
organized into the KRK.135   
 Unfortunately for Rühe and for Germany, the pace of world events did not 
slow down to allow for German defense restructuring.  The very types of 
incidents and instability which were feared by most western governments, and 
which had been the anticipated threat driving German defense reform, were 
breaking out all around the world in record numbers.  The so-called new world 
disorder was very quickly proving to be every bit as challenging, albeit in different 
ways, as the previous Cold War bi-polar world.  From the end of the Second 
World War until the beginning of 1988, a mere thirteen peacekeeping missions 
were conducted by the UN.  At the beginning of 1993, more than 80,000 “Blue 
Helmets” from 70 states were employed in a total of thirteen UN peacekeeping 
missions, and a newly united Germany was now being pressured to do its part.  
By the end of 1992, the Bundeswehr found itself with troops and medical units 
deployed in Cambodia, airlift operations in Sarajevo, and similar units taking part 
in the humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia.  Additionally, German units 
were still participating in the ongoing Kurdish relief operation in Turkey and Iran, 
and were supporting UNSCOM operations in Iraq.136  This assumption of a 
growing international military role created a fundamental debate among German 
leaders and policy makers that would play a central role in Bundeswehr reform 
efforts for the next several years, and one that would involve two conflicting 
principles of German strategic culture.   
 The central questions surrounding what is known as the ‘out of area 
debate’ were: In what types of military actions should the Bundeswehr be able to 
participate? Was a constitutional amendment required? How should decisions 
regarding the use of German armed forces be made?  German leaders struggled 
to come to grips with these questions at a time when the last elements of Soviet 
forces were still leaving German territory; the Bundeswehr was still integrating 
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the remainder of the East German National People’s Army as well as execute the 
1992 restructuring plan outlined above; and the main focus of German foreign 
policy was the stability of Eastern Europe.  Germany’s response to these 
challenges and efforts to answer the questions surrounding the out of area 
debate was highly influenced by its prevailing, yet at times conflicting, national 
security culture.  The Bundeswehr’s participation in several international 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions around the world showed Germany’s 
willingness to live up to its international commitments and to be a reliable partner, 
which was an important aspect of German national security culture.  But at the 
same time, the substantial reluctance and reservation of many politicians to 
engage in these activities reveals another aspect of German national security 
culture; a preference to maintain a low profile in international security issues and 
to refrain from the use of military force as much as possible, especially when the 
actual territory of Germany is not directly threatened.   
 The central issue in the debate over how Germany should respond to out 
of area crises and conflicts revolved around the interpretation of the German 
constitution, or Basic Law, in so far as the armed forces are concerned.  Article 
26 of the Basic Law contains an explicit ban on preparations for military 
aggression.  Article 24 allows Germany to, “become a party to a system of 
collective security,” and consents to, “such limitations on its sovereign powers as 
will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among 
the nations of the world.”  Finally, Article 87a states that the armed forces are to 
be for defense purposes, and that “other than for defense purposes the Armed 
Forces may only be employed to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic 
Law.”  As one might imagine, these rather ambiguous and somewhat 
contradictory provisions lent themselves to a wide range of interpretations.  The 
highly restrictive interpretation of the law, centering on Article 87a, would allow 
the Bundeswehr to be used only for the defense of German territory, but this 
position conflicted with the mutual defense obligations Germany had undertaken 
as a member of NATO and the Western European Union.  The other extreme 
interpretation, centering on Article 24, would allow German participation in any 
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act of individual or collective self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the UN 
charter, which Germany had been a party to since the early 1970s.  Obviously 
either one of these interpretations had tremendous impact upon the 
Bundeswehr’s missions, tasks, and structure.   
 Over the years, a strong cross-party consensus had developed on an 
interpretation of the Law which held that the Bundeswehr could be used for the 
defense of Germany and its allies but not for any other military purpose (strictly 
humanitarian missions were permitted as part of an international organization).  
During the Cold War, the biggest reason for this interpretation was the fear that 
German military involvement in out of area conflicts could lead to a direct clash 
with East German forces or provoke Soviet retaliation in Central Europe.137  
Therefore, the situation now facing Germany was much different than during the 
Cold War and the debate over the need for a constitutional amendment to allow 
German involvement in the type of missions now being demanded was 
reopened.   
  In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court issued a landmark ruling 
which effectively lifted the alleged constitutional restrictions on the employment of 
German armed forces outside of German territory.  The court ruled that the 
constitution did not prohibit the deployment of German troops outside the NATO 
area, but under the principle of democratic civilian control of the armed forces, 
the Bundestag (German parliament) must still approve the deployment and the 
mission must be under the auspices of an alliance structure to which Germany 
was a party (the UN, NATO, WEU, etc.).  But despite this decision, no profound 
policy change was produced as a result.  Even when the violence erupted in the 
Balkans in late 1994, Germany was still unsure of exactly how to handle the 
series of allied requests for German peacekeeping contributions.  Ultimately the 
Bundeswehr did participate, but did so with numerous self-imposed conditions 
and limitations. 138  This goes to show that the issues surrounding this debate are 
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more cultural than legal.  In fact, this constitutional question is still a thorn in the 
side of the Bundeswehr as was evidenced at the October 2003 NATO Informal 
Meeting of Defense Ministers in Colorado Springs when, in executing a NATO 
simulation exercise, German Defense Minister Struck had to suspend his forces 
activities in the exercise until notional approval from the Bundestag had been 
obtained for the simulated commitment of German forces to the conflict.139   
 
C. COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW ENVIRONMENT 1993-1999 
 A multitude of forces, both internal and external, continued to influence the 
course of Bundeswehr reform efforts throughout the rest of the 1990s.  In the 
realm of external influences, the two major players that had the most effect upon 
Germany’s plans were the European Union and NATO.  In the landmark 1993 
Treaty on European Union, commonly called the Maastricht Treaty, the EU 
announced its intention to expand beyond its economic and judicial efforts and 
get into the defense and security business.  In Title V, Article J.1 of the treaty, the 
Union stated it, “shall define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy…covering all areas of foreign and security policy,” (which came to be 
referred to as CFSP).  Article J.4, although also vague, stated, “The common 
foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the 
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defence.”140  Although Maastricht was just the infant 
stages of CFSP development, the EU had taken a large step toward the idea of 
developing defense and military capabilities of its own, an idea which would be 
met with a great deal of controversy in the coming years.  While the immediate 
impact of the CFSP idea upon Germany’s defense reforms was not that 
substantial, it would become so in the near future and it did add one more issue 
to an already complicated political situation.  Specifically for the Bundeswehr, the 
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notion that German armed forces may in the future become obligated to yet 
another collective defense organization could not have been the best news.  The 
Bundeswehr was already facing the need to be able to simultaneously send 
forces to both a NATO and UN contingency mission; a requirement that would 
become official doctrine in the 1994 White Paper published by the Ministry of 
Defense.   
 The other major external influence on current and future Bundeswehr 
reforms was, not unexpectedly, NATO.  It goes without saying that NATO has 
heavily influenced the Bundeswehr since its creation in 1956.  Germany agreed 
to nest the overall command structure of the Bundeswehr underneath NATO 
Supreme Command and has always been extremely responsive to NATO in 
terms of overall armament and strategy concepts.  This arrangement served 
Germany and NATO well during the Cold War when the mission was almost 
exclusively territorial defense.  However, by the 1990s it was obvious that a lot 
had changed.  Only four months after the Constitutional Court’s decision on 
Bundeswehr deployments, NATO asked Germany to participate in its growing 
involvement in the Balkans, specifically they asked for six to eight ECR-Tornado 
combat aircraft (for radar suppression and reconnaissance)141 to help enforce 
the UN flight ban over Bosnia.  While the German government was wrestling with 
obtaining Bundestag approval to provide the requested assistance, the situation 
became more complex in June 1995 when NATO was faced with putting together 
a Rapid Reaction Force in order to protect a possible redeployment of the UN 
forces in Bosnia.  This time the government obtained a substantial majority in the 
Bundestag allowing the Bundeswehr to offer some 1,800 troops plus the 
previously requested aircraft, but the cultural tendency of restraint was still very 
much present, forcing the government to insist that no German forces be 
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stationed in the former Yugoslav territory and that the aircraft be used only to 
protect the Rapid Reaction Force.142   
 By the time NATO was ready to send in troops to implement the measures 
of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995 (called Implementation Force, 
or IFOR), the German government had been able to frame the situation in the 
Balkans as a mission required to prevent war, not wage it.  This argument won 
over most of the opposition leaders and the Bundestag approved Germany’s 
participation in both IFOR, and one year later in SFOR, by an overwhelming 
majority.  The huge success of these NATO missions, and the superb 
performance of Bundeswehr troops during them, was a turning point for 
Germany’s foreign and defence policy and was a defining moment for its national 
security culture.  IFOR was the largest operation abroad in the history of the 
Bundeswehr, and SFOR saw the stationing of German troops inside Bosnia as a 
full and equal participant in the operation.  Despite the many limitations and 
restrictions still placed on Germany’s involvement in both missions, it was none 
the less a defeat for those in Germany that feared the presence of German 
troops would only exacerbate the situation and who did not think it was 
appropriate for the Bundeswehr to take on such a high profile military role in the 
world.  Germany could now be a part of the solution, not the problem.143  
 The other critical influence of NATO upon the Bundeswehr during the late 
1990s was through the issues of “burden sharing” and “the capabilities gap.”  
While the burden sharing debate is certainly not new within NATO, it gained 
considerable attention as a result of NATO operations in the Balkans, especially 
after the Kosovo air war in 1999.  In brief, burden sharing refers to the rather 
one-sided situation that developed out of the Cold War when the United States’ 
nuclear arsenal and more mobile conventional forces carried the lion’s share of 
the defense burden for Europe.  During the some forty years of the Cold War,                                             
142 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 June 1995 p.1, translation in Foreign Broadcast 
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p.216-17.  
59 
most European nations stuck predominantly to static territorial defense and did 
not develop any major nuclear weapons capability.  This situation also 
simultaneously resulted in what is known as the capabilities gap.  During the 
Cold War, most European defense budgets remained substantially higher than 
they would be afterwards, but due to nature of the mission this money was not 
devoted to developing the latest technologically advanced equipment, nor 
towards obtaining strategic lift capabilities to move their forces.  Therefore by the 
late 1990s, increasing activities by United States forces around the world and the 
number of NATO activities in the Balkans left many asking, including the NATO 
Secretary General at the time, why the Europeans can not shoulder a bigger 
share of the load and wondering where would they be without the United States? 
 For Germany and the Bundeswehr, these questions could not have come 
at a worse time.  The 1994 defense policy guidelines called for even more cuts to 
the overall size and structure of the armed forces that was laid out in 1992.  The 
army would be reduced to just seven divisions and 22 combat brigades, with only 
six instead of seven of the brigades being devoted to the crisis reaction forces 
(KRK).  Additionally, Defense Minister Rühe was troubled by the escalating costs 
of the proposed Eurofighter aircraft that was intended to replace Germany’s 
aging fleet of F-4 Phantom aircraft, forcing him to push for a 30% cheaper 
version called Eurofighter 2000.144  Financial constraints continued to get tighter 
in 1996 when another 51.1 million Euros were unexpectedly cut from an already 
shrinking defense budget, the entire amount coming out of the investment 
portion. 145  All of this meant that if anything, the ability for Germany to close the 
capabilities gap was getting worse not better. 
 The internal influences upon the Bundeswehr in the mid to late 1990s 
were no less important than the external.  As eluded to earlier, the requirement 
for the Bundeswehr to conduct an increasing number of deployments outside of 
Germany revealed the need for an independent national command and control 
element for the Bundeswehr, which had been previously nonexistent due to 
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NATO command and control arrangements.  Given Germany’s past history, this 
need was much more easily stated than resolved.  German officials had to be 
sensitive to the fact that any establishment of an autonomous national command 
authority would undoubtedly renew memories of Wehrmacht excesses and of the 
dubious control of the Prussian General Staff.  Wary of this fact, German leaders 
proceeded with caution and addressed the problem on two levels.  First, the 
operational command capabilities of the individual services were expanded.  
Since the air force and the navy already had operational command headquarters 
of their own, the army established the Army Operations Command 
(Heeresführungskommando) in Koblenz which was activated in 1994.  The army 
could now conduct independent operations above the corps level.146    
 Second, the Ministry of Defense established a very small operational staff 
(Einsatzführung Bundeswehr) and a coordination staff for operational tasks 
(Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben) within a section of the existing Joint 
Staff in 1993.  This purposefully low-key move gave the Generalinspekteur, who 
heads the Joint Staff, the ability to coordinate military deployments, but was in 
reality inadequate to properly plan and coordinate joint operations.  
Consequently, in 1995 a small central command center (Führungszentrum) was 
set up also within the Joint Staff.  This command center was responsible for both 
planning and coordinating joint Bundeswehr operations while informing and 
advising the Minister of Defense around the clock.  But even these very slow and 
incremental moves were met by charges from the press of creating the first 
General Staff in Bundeswehr history.  A fact that no doubt had an impact upon 
the government because even these modest command and control changes 
were not improved upon for some years to come, despite the obvious limitations 
they presented for the Joint Staff.147     
 The second internal influence that, perhaps more than any other, limited 
the shape and pace of Bundeswehr reform was the worsening financial picture of 
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the late 1990s.  Ministry of Defense publications, such as the 1994 White Paper, 
called for the need to streamline, economize, and further cut costs throughout the 
1990s.  This led to large cuts in the German arms industry and to even less 
money for the investment portion of the defense budget.  “By the end of 1993, 
according to one official estimate, cuts in the investment budget had already 
caused the loss of half of the 280,000 jobs in the German arms industry, and 
another 40,000 to 60,000 positions were threatened.”148  The 1994 White Paper 
noted that the Bundeswehr “will not need much new material in the 1990s.”149  
One can only speculate if this statement is less a recognition of the state of the 
Bundeswehr’s equipment, and more a result of the 358 million Euro cost of 
Germany’s participation in IFOR.150  Nevertheless, things would continue to 
worsen financially until 1997 when the German defense budget bottomed out at 
23.6 billion Euros.151   
 
D. THE SPD TAKES OVER 
 During the rather tumultuous years between the publication of the 1994 
White Paper and the German national elections in 1998, no official document 
along the lines of a White Paper or Defense Policy Guidelines was published.  
The Ministry of Defense, which was sufficiently occupied dealing with the already 
prescribed reforms at the same time as the Bundeswehr was engaged in the 
Balkans, did mange to submit more than one draft of proposed doctrinal changes 
for the new Bundeswehr, but these efforts never made it past the politicians who 
were still not ready to commit themselves to any one given direction in such a 
fluid and fast moving environment.  But 1999 saw a flurry of activity in the realm 
of German and European security and defense policy.  The first Social Democrat 
since 1983 was elected to the Chancellorship in 1998 in the person of Gerhard 
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Schröder (under the so-called Red/Green coalition of the SPD and Green 
Parties), and with him came the new Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping.   
 Despite the efforts of Rühe and the CDU/CSU government of Kohl to 
affect a quite extensive overhaul of the Bundeswehr in their 1992 and 1994 
programs, Scharping and the Red/Green Schröder government inherited an 
incomplete reorganization of the Federal Republic’s security and defense 
apparatus.  The “incremental approach to defense normalization”152 as one writer 
described it, was beginning to receive some rather stark criticism from the more 
conservative side of Germany foreign and defense policy observers.  The main 
complaint coming from this group was, in short, that the government’s 
incremental approach toward participation in peace support operations had not 
been matched with an equally important policy of addressing the armed forces 
and its role in German society.153   
 Immediately upon taking over the MoD, the new Defense Minister Rudolf 
Scharping took steps to address this criticism.  Scharping quickly commissioned 
a blue ribbon panel of experts, led by former Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker, to analyze the Bundeswehr’s challenges and needs, and to make 
proposals for its reform.  This group of high profile and well respected military 
experts, businessmen, and former government officials, known as the 
Bundeswehr Reform Commission, released its 179 page report on 23 May 2000 
with a blunt but clear conclusion:  “The way the Bundeswehr looks today, it is not 
capable to cope with the tasks it has to fulfill.”154       
 The report from the Bundeswehr Reform Commission addressed all 
aspects of German defense structures, from risk assessment and threat analysis 
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to equipment needs and command and control changes.  But of the report’s 15 
major recommendations, the ones that got the most attention were concerning 
overall troop strength and conscription.  The Weizsäcker report recommended an 
overall strength of 240,000 troops—140,000 of those for crisis reaction—and 
cutting the number of conscripts from 130,000 to just 30,000.  The report also 
recommended sticking with conscription at least for the near future, and kept the 
length of compulsory service at 10 months.155  With these changes the 
commission envisioned a more balanced and more modern force suited for the 
new challenges of the 21st century.   
 At the same time the Weizsäcker commission was preparing its report, 
Scharping asked the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (Generalinspekteur von 
Kirchbach) to work on his own reform plan in order to start up a broad public 
discussion about the future shape and role of the Bundeswehr.  Released 
concurrently with the Weizsäcker report, von Kirchbach’s plan contained many 
similarities with the Reform Commission’s overall concept for creating more 
modern deployable forces for use mainly in a crisis reaction role.  Both reports 
assumed the requirement to perform two crisis reaction missions at the same 
time, both called for improvements in the areas outlined by NATO’s Defense 
Capabilities Initiative, and both stood by conscription although von Kirchbach’s 
plan saw compulsory service being shortened to 9 months.  But in the main issue 
of overall troop strength, von Kirchbach called for a larger total force of 290,000 
with 157,000 of those in the KRK (crisis reaction forces).  He also wanted a much 
larger number of conscripts retained—84,000.156    
 Since assuming office Scharping had remained tight lipped about his own 
preferences for Bundeswehr reform, but then only hours after the Weizsäcker 
report had been released he announced that he would present his own plan in a 
cabinet meeting scheduled for 14 June 2000.  And in another unexpected move 
only days after von Kirchbach had released his own report; Scharping fired his 
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Generalinspekteur, saying publicly that von Kirchbach had asked to retire in 
order to allow for continuity of reform under a new Generalinspekteur (which was 
to be Air Force General Harald Kujat).  In reality, von Kirchbach, viewed as a 
‘soldier’s soldier’ and well liked by the troops, had not seen eye to eye with the 
career politician Scharping for months and had actually asked to retire two weeks 
before the official announcement from the MoD.157 According to press reports, 
von Kirchbach felt Scharping was using the Bundeswehr’s senior leadership as a 
‘political toy’ (or politischen Spielball) and was not going in the right direction with 
Bundeswehr reform.  Von Kirchbach did not want to be associated with the 
direction that was about to be announced and tried to leave in protest, but 
Scharping did not accept his resignation until after the public release of both the 
Weizsäcker report and the Generalinspekteur’s own Cornerstone paper.158  
  Scharping’s plan, titled The Bundeswehr—Advancing steadily into the 21st 
Century—Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal, fell basically in the middle 
between the Weizsäcker and the von Kirchbach proposals.159  The overall 
strength of the armed forces was set at around 255,000, with 150,000 of those 
for the KRK (crisis reaction forces).  The number of conscripts was set at around 
80,000 with a reduction in the length of compulsory military service from 10 to 9 
months beginning in 2002.160  Like all ministers before him, Scharping stood by 
the need to retain conscription in order to ensure adequate force levels and to 
keep the Bundeswehr anchored in society.   
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 The Scharping plan also made significant changes in the structure and 
command relationships of the Bundeswehr.161  The position of the Chief of Staff 
of the Bundeswehr (Generalinspekteur) was strengthened in the areas of force 
planning, and mission planning and execution.  Additionally, in order to optimize 
all common tasks within the Bundeswehr, all the command support, intelligence 
and support assets, and some of the training assets, three new entities were 
created.  First, and by far the most significant creation, was the Joint Support 
Service (Streitkräftebasis).  The creation of the Joint Support Service 
represented the most significant increase in operational command and control of 
the Bundeswehr since the 1995 Führungszentrum (central command center) was 
set up within the Joint Staff.  The new Joint Support Service consists of the Joint 
Support Command (Streitkräfteunterstützungskommando), Joint Operations 
Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr), and the Armed Forces 
Offices (Streitkräfteamt).  Its personnel distribution is 70% army, 22% air force, 
and 8% navy; with 20,000 civilian positions and about 50,000 military 
positions.162  Essentially, all aspects of Bundeswehr logistics, psychological 
operations, and strategic intelligence were untied under the Joint Support 
Command, as well as command and control of the various Military District 
Commands or Wehrbereichskommandos (which were reduced from seven to 
four).  The Joint Operations Command was given the responsibility for planning 
and conducting all German armed forces operations and will also serve as the 
national element and infrastructure for a European Union Operations 
Headquarters for foreign deployments.  The creation of this Operations 
Command abolished the distinction between reaction forces and main defense 
forces.163  
                                            
161 While the Scharping plan was published in June 2000 under the Cornerstones of a 
Fundamental Renewal document, the most extensive explanation of the details of the reform plan 
in English was not provided until April 2002 with the publication of The Bundeswehr in 2002, the 
Current Situation and Perspectives. For this reason, the details of the Scharping plan cited here 
come from the April 2002 document.    
162 Vizeadmiral Bernd Heise, Die Streitkräftebasis als Service und Force Provider für die 
Bundeswehr im In- und Ausland, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregiergung (Bonn: 
December 2001), www.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/   
163 Federal Ministry of Defense, The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and 
Perspectives, (Berlin: April 2002), p.46-47.   
66 
 The second new entity, the Bundeswehr Central Medical Service, was the 
result of a major reorganization of all medical assets within the Bundeswehr.  
Under the control of the Surgeon General, the Central Medical Service consists 
of the Medical Forces Command and the Medical Office.  Under the Medical 
Forces Command, four sub-commands and a new Rapid Reaction Medical Force 
was established.  This consolidated tactical treatment centers, tactical medical 
units, and Bundeswehr station hospitals under one command.164   
 The third new entity created by Scharping was the new Federal Office of 
Information Management and Information Technology of the Bundeswehr (Bw IT 
Office), and did not come into existence until 2002.  Given NATO’s recent 
emphasis on new technology via the 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative, this 
new Bundeswehr IT Office was seen as extremely important.  Under the Federal 
Ministry of Defense IT Director, responsibility for IT system planning, concepts, 
implementation and use was placed in the hands of one person.  This transferred 
the IT responsibilities of 13 different agencies to the central Bw IT Office.165   
 In the area of individual service restructuring Scharping made some minor 
adjustments, the details of which were outlined most clearly in his 2002 report, 
The Bundeswehr in 2002, The Current Situation and Perspectives.  The 1994 
decision to reduce the army down to seven divisions was reversed, with the 
number of divisions being set at eight (the same number called for in the 1992 
DPG).  Of the eight divisions, five would be mechanized, one special operations, 
one air mobile, and one combat support division called the Army Support Forces 
Command.  The air force was reorganized into four air divisions, an Air Transport 
Command, and an Air Force Operations Command.  The navy was left 
unchanged with five flotillas under the Fleet Command.166   
 As has been stressed numerous times in this thesis, the incremental 
attempts at Bundeswehr reform since 1990 have been substantially affected by 
the intricate relationships associated with Germany’s NATO alliance membership                                             
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and with Germany’s role in the European Union and its efforts to establish a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  Certainly Rudolf Scharping found 
his tenure as Defense Minister to be no exception to this rule.  While attempting 
to push his own reform plan, as outlined above, through to fruition from 1999 to 
2001, Scharping and the Schröder government felt the pressures coming from 
both the NATO and EU reactions to two events that would shape Western foreign 
and security policies for years to come.  Those two watershed events were the 
1999 Kosovo air war and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States.167  The resulting NATO and EU policies and programs stemming from 
these events had tremendous impact upon the character of German defense 
reform leading into the new century.   
 In short, the main lessoned learned by the European members of NATO 
from the Alliance’s military actions in Kosovo in 1999 was that they were entirely 
too dependent upon the United States’ military might.  In contrast to IFOR and 
SFOR where the European allies provided the majority of ground troops, the 
Kosovo air war (Operation Allied Force) was almost entirely dominated by the 
United States.  The US flew 60% of all air sorties and dropped 80% of all 
precision-guided munitions in Operation Allied Force.168  The overall effect of this 
poor showing on the part of the Europeans was summed up by Marshall Center 
expert Peter van Ham: 
At the same time as the debate ensued concerning a new EU 
defense role, developments in Kosovo confronted European 
governments with the fact that they were militarily impotent to 
support regional crisis management, even in a situation that was in 
immediate geographic proximity.169   
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Both NATO and the EU reacted to the embarrassment of Allied Force 
before the end of the year—NATO with its new Strategic Concept and Defense 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and the EU with the Helsinki Headline Goals and 
plans for a European rapid reaction force.  The main theme of NATO’s 
Washington Summit in April of 1999, and a few months later the theme of its new 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson, was capabilities, capabilities, and 
capabilities.  NATO’s new Strategic Concept acknowledged that crisis response 
operations like those in Bosnia and Kosovo were likely to remain a key aspect of 
NATO’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic peace and security170; and in light of the 
deficiencies experienced during those operations NATO launched the Defense 
Capabilities Initiative.  DCI was aimed at improving the military capabilities of its 
members (primarily European members) in five main categories: mobility and 
deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable 
communications.171   
With Kosovo in the forefront of their minds, the European Union 
addressed very much the same issues as NATO at its December 1999 European 
Council meeting in Helsinki.  Adding to their previous efforts to build up a 
European Security and Defense Policy (EDSP), the EU established what are 
known as the “Headline Goals” for its member states in terms of their military 
capabilities for crisis management operations.  The Headline Goals called for the 
creation of a European force of up to 60,000 troops able to deploy within 60 days 
of notification and sustainable for up to one year, in order to carry out the full 
range of the so-called Petersberg tasks outlined in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.  
These tasks consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; and tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.  This European 
rapid reaction force was to be operational no later than 2003, and would give the 
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EU autonomous capacity to take decisions where NATO was not, or chose not to 
be, engaged.172   
The six to eight months from the announcement of both the NATO and EU 
initiatives to the publication of Scharping’s reform plan, were filled with 
speculation from observers of German defense policy as to what these initiatives 
meant for Germany, and as to which side Germany would support the most—the 
European or Atlantic.  Opinions ranged from claiming that German foreign and 
security policy would become “Europeanized,” to those worried about a new 
German “assertiveness.”  But the more tangible concern shared by French, 
British, and some German writers, seemed to be that Germany lacked the fiscal 
resources to meet the requirements of Helsinki or Washington.173  Scharping’s 
middle of the road approach did not end this debate one way or the other.  
Instead, his reform plan fit the German pattern of trying to ride the fence between 
satisfying external alliance and EU concerns and ensuring that no drastic moves 
were made to upset their domestic audience (i.e. abolish conscription, dramatic 
force level cuts, or large defense budget increases).  Representative of this 
satisfy both sides approach is this passage out of the 2000 Bundeswehr plan:  
Strengthening the European Security and Defense Identity within 
the Alliance and further developing the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) in the European Union are complementary, 
intertwined processes aimed at providing the Europeans the 
capability to act independently in the field of political and military 
crisis management (Petersberg missions).174   
To that end, Germany promised some 32,000 soldiers, 130 aircraft and 18 ships 
toward the fulfillment of the Helsinki Headline Goals175, and selected three of the 
five areas for improvement listed in NATO’s DCI for its new “capability profile;” 
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namely strategic deployability, global intelligence, and command, control, & 
communication capability.176  The bottom line message of these two programs 
taken together for the Bundeswehr was that it must be capable of participating in 
two medium-scale operations simultaneously, a realization that was confirmed in 
Scharping’s 2000 plan.    
But to be fair to Scharping and the German government, their reform 
plans, middle of the road or not, were headed in the right direction and reflected 
the maturation of the forces and influences that had been mounting from NATO, 
the EU and from German domestic politics for several very unpredictable and 
violent years.  Very real and tangible improvements were made in the key areas 
addressed by both NATO’s DCI and the EU’s Petersberg tasks.  It improved the 
area of command and control of deployed forces by creating the BwOPSCOM. It 
improved efficiency and deployability by abolishing the distinction between crisis 
reaction forces and territorial defense forces and by concentrating on lighter 
weapons platforms; and it improved financial management by making smarter 
procurement decisions and by going to what Scharping called “Innovation, 
Investment and Economic Efficiency in the Bundeswehr.”177  But perhaps 
Scharping’s most notable victory was the deal he struck with Eichel’s Ministry of 
Finance whereby 80% of the proceeds from the sale of property from closed 
down Bundeswehr installations will be allocated back to the defense budget as 
additional revenue.178  This agreement, plus Eichel’s promise to stabilize the 
overall German defense budget at 24.4 billion Euros through 2006, seemed to 
stop the financial blood letting that began in the early 1990s, and helped to shore 
up allied confidence in Germany’s ability to meet its alliance obligations.    
Just when it seemed the Ministry of Defense was beginning to make real 
progress with reform plans and budget issues, the second watershed event 
influencing not only German, but most major powers’ foreign and security policies 
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occurred.  The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon not only killed almost 3,000 innocent people, but it more 
importantly threw the United States, and to a much lesser degree Europe, into a 
global war on terrorism.  To adequately discuss and analyze in detail the effects 
of the 11 September attacks and ensuing US-led actions on European foreign 
and security policy (especially the US-German relationship) would require far 
more space than this thesis is at liberty to give.  Therefore, suffice it to say that 
net effect of the policies and actions surrounding the 11 September attacks on 
German defense policy was an increase in demand for German military and 
security resources.   
In the near term, NATO’s declaration of Article 5 (the mutual defense 
clause) on 12 September 2001 set the stage for Germany’s participation in 
operations Active Endeavor (naval forces in the Mediterranean), Eagle Assist 
(NATO AWACS duty in the USA), and Enduring Freedom (coalition actions in 
Afghanistan).  All together this consumed approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr 
troops179 in various capacities, not counting the police and security forces that 
were devoted to securing American military bases in Germany in order to free up 
US soldiers for duties in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  In the long term, 
Germany’s commitment to help fight the international war on terrorism led it to 
participate in, and later take command of, the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan—to the surprise of some observers, even before 
NATO agreed to be intimately involved.180  At present, Germany still has troops 
and assets committed to a majority of these operations.   
A great deal had transpired in the world and within the Bendlerblock 
(home of the German Ministry of Defense) by the time Scharping published his 
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2002 Situation and Perspectives document in April.  In the realm of strategic 
culture, Germany seemed to be defying, at least to a certain extent, the long held 
policy of reticence or restraint (Zurückhaltung) in favor of a new definition of what 
it meant to be a reliable ally (Bündnisfähigkeit).  At the time Scharping took over 
as Defense Minister, the Bundeswehr had about 2,800 soldiers deployed on 
peacekeeping missions (mainly in Bosnia), but by April 2002 it had some 10,000 
troops serving in a multitude of operations from Kosovo to the Horn of Africa and 
Afghanistan.181  Since the days of the Armee der Einheit, three different defense 
ministers had steered the Bundeswehr through unification and the demands to 
see a ‘peace dividend;’ almost constant budget cuts; the 1991 Gulf War; near 
war in the Balkans; the demands of an emerging EU military capacity and 
defense policy; the sensitivities of an unsure post-Cold War NATO alliance; and 
was now contending with the new terrorism of a post-9/11 world.  Through it all 
German leaders had struggled to maintain a sense of calculability in their actions 
(Berechenbarkeit) in the face of such incalculable times—and it was not over yet.   
In his personal note in the preface to the 2002 document, Scharping had 
to admit: 
Our soldiers are well-trained and well-equipped.  Even so, every 
operation has brought it home to us that the Bundeswehr does not 
yet have the capabilities needed to be employed in the broadened 
task spectrum.  The urgency of the need for reform can hardly be 
more evident.  What is more, we must face the fact that 
developments in international affairs will not ease the situation in 
the foreseeable future.  This is why we are working flat out to 
implement the reform of the Bundeswehr.182    
 In many ways these words represent what the MoD had been facing since 
1991and is still facing today.  But Scharping, in his 2002 document, tried to take 
the major plans and programs of his June 2000 Cornerstone plan and update 
them to address the new challenges of post-9/11 terrorism, new influences from 
NATO and the EU, as well as the ever problematic financial situation.  All of the 
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major restructuring plans announced in the 2000 plan were reiterated in the 2002 
Situation and Perspectives document, and the primary missions of the 
Bundeswehr remained the same.  Protecting Germany and its citizens against 
external dangers, and defending Germany and its allies were the two main 
missions, and the associated sub-tasks needed to accomplish these missions 
read very much like the European Union’s Petersberg tasks.183   
 The 2002 document emphasized that through the Bundeswehr’s 
participation in international operations around the world, especially since 9/11, 
Germany was shouldering its international responsibility in a manner 
commensurate with its weight in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and was 
honoring its expression of solidarity with the United States.  It also spoke in detail 
of the advantages of its modern business management program designed to 
increase efficiency, cut costs, and streamline the procurement process, all of 
which were to allow the Bundeswehr to operate within constrained budget 
parameters, yet still realize its modernization and procurement goals through 
2006.  Key to this effort was the budget arrangement with the Finance Ministry 
mentioned earlier (80% of the proceeds from the sale of MoD property goes back 
to Bundeswehr coffers), and the new Development, Procurement and 
Management Group (GEBB) first mentioned in the 2000 plan.   
 Unfortunately, Rudolf Scharping did not remain in office long enough to 
see his reform efforts come to fruition.  Only three months after the publication of 
the 2002 document, Scharping was forced to resign over a 
misappropriation/misuse of Bundeswehr assets scandal in July 2002.  This set 
the stage for the arrival of the current Minister of Defense, Dr. Peter Stuck, that 
same month.  After taking the rest of 2002 to settle in to his new position and 
take stock of the situation, Struck announced his own ideas on Bundeswehr 
reform in May of 2003 through the publication of the first Defense Policy 
Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, or VPR) since 1992.  Struck’s 
2003 guidelines were based upon the work the Weizsäcker commission and 
                                            
183 Ibid. p.24-26.   
74 
corresponded with the broad understanding of defense that had evolved over the 
past few years, but Struck’s plan also called into question the middle of the road 
approach taken by Scharping.  Struck knew that Scharping’s reductions in troop 
levels and number of bases were not enough, and more cuts would have to be 
made in order to realize the savings necessary to truly carry out comprehensive 
Bundeswehr reform.   
 In many aspects, the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines contained the same 
overarching ideas about security and defense policy as previous reform efforts.  
The three main areas were listed as the “transatlantic partnership,” the 
“European area of stability,” and participation “in UN and OSCE efforts.”184  It 
contained familiar references to the importance of allied and multilateral 
relationships such as: “the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only 
together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context,” and 
“Germany’s NATO membership is the cornerstone of its security.”185  It also 
reflected the underlying tension that had been developing during the Scharping 
years between the need to remain firmly connected to the US and the need to 
clearly support EU defense efforts.  Germany, always in the middle, placated 
both sides by shrewdly saying, “The United States of America remain 
indispensable to European security” in one section, and then saying, “The EU is 
the nucleus of the European area of stability” in another.186      
 But underneath this familiar strategic culture rhetoric laid some rather new 
realizations which attest to the growing determination of German defense leaders 
to break out of their culture of reticence and act more inline with Germany’s 
weight in the international community.  The first of these realizations was clearly 
stated in section titled The Bundeswehr on Operations by saying, “The 
Bundeswehr is more frequently assuming a leading role in multinational 
operations,” and that the necessity to participate in these operations may arise 
                                            
184 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defence Policy Guidelines, (Berlin: 21 May 2003), p.9, Para. 
40.  
185 Ibid. p.10, Para. 42, 46.   
186 Ibid. p.8, Para.32; p.11, Para.50.   
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“anywhere in the world,” may be at short notice and “may extend across the 
entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations…even beyond the 
boundaries of Allied territory.”187  The pragmatic rationale behind assuming a 
leading role in multinational operations was two fold.  First, the security 
environment was characterized by “changed risks and new opportunities.”  “At 
present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the 
German territory.”188  In short, since there is no threat to Germany itself, it can 
afford to concentrate on the prevention and containment of more distant and 
regional crises and conflicts abroad.  Second, Germany’s obligation to be a 
reliable ally and partner demands that it take a leading role when needed.  Since 
Bundeswehr operations in places like Somalia, East Timor and the Balkans, even 
the German people were beginning to see this side of the logic, at least in terms 
of humanitarian intervention in order to stop human suffering.   
 The second new realization of the 2003 guidelines was a natural 
extension of the first.  If the Bundeswehr was going to take on a more leading 
role in the world, then the way to do it—given Germany’s historical baggage, 
strategic culture, and material limitations—was through the socially and politically 
acceptable  missions of “conflict prevention and crisis management.”  Under the 
heading Key statements it said: “The security situation calls for a security and 
defence policy that is geared to the prevention and containment of crises and 
conflicts…”189  In fact, “conflict prevention and crisis management” became the 
central operational theme of the entire 2003 DPG, with this phrase appearing 19 
times in only a 20 page document.  International conflict prevention and crisis 
management became the number one task of the Bundeswehr, followed by 
support of allies and protection of Germany and its citizens.  The consequences 
of the Bundeswehr making conflict prevention and crisis management its main 
focus were outlined in section VIII. Consequences for the Bundeswehr.  The 
main impact was that “suitable and sufficient forces must be kept available at 
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high readiness and with a rapid response capability.”190  It also meant that these 
forces had to be highly professional and flexible with a high degree of 
interoperability.191  This obviously put a premium on the Bundeswehr’s 
transformation efforts.  In the words of the MoD, the tasks of conflict prevention 
and crisis management “do in fact determine the structure of the 
Bundeswehr.”192   
 Struck envisioned meeting these goals through a bold combination of role 
specialization and “jointness-oriented” way of thinking.  Realizing the fiscal 
restraints under which he was operating, Struck saw cooperating with allies and 
partners in terms of harmonizing capabilities as a way to avoid duplication of 
capacities, and as a way of targeting Germany’s scarce financial resources in 
one direction.  It would be possible to dispense with certain individual capabilities 
if these could be provided or taken over by other nations’ forces.  This is in line 
with the NATO idea of niche contributions formalized at the 2002 Prague summit, 
where Germany was asked to take the lead in the area of air transport.  The MoD 
decided to order 60 new Airbus A400M aircraft which are slated to be delivered 
in 2010.193  Additionally, any facility or service that did not directly contribute to 
the attainment of core goals (conflict prevention and crisis management) would 
be subject to “critical examination.”  The corollary to role specialization was 
jointness within the Bundeswehr.  To Struck, increased demands necessitated an 
unrestricted application of jointness in thinking and acting, and he made it clear 
that the Bundeswehr’s overall capability would take priority over the capabilities 
of the individual services.  Although the full ramifications of this way of thinking 
were not felt until 2004, one example of things to come was the decision to 
disband the navy’s TORNADO air wing and turn its aircraft over to the air force, 
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which will assume sea strike responsibilities by the end of 2005.194  This along 
with other moves toward jointness was not far off.   
 There is no doubt Struck’s 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines would have 
been seen as both utopian and unacceptable ten years ago.  The idea that a 
German defense minister would assert that German defense begins at the Hindu 
Kush, as Struck did in 2003, was unthinkable before 2001.  But at the end of 
2003 German troops were serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf area.  Despite 
Germany’s disagreement with the US over the war in Iraq and its realist attitude 
toward foreign policy, Struck’s ideas were compatible with the shift occurring in 
US, NATO, and EU doctrine toward a definition of new threats associated with 
international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed 
states.195  Struck has even proven he can hold his own in the face of allegations 
about an “old” versus “new Europe” which were spawned by the comments of  
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.   
 But despite these laudable improvements, at least two main questions 
remained going into 2004 regarding Bundeswehr reform and transformation.  
First is the question of conscription.  The German government’s position has 
always been that conscription (the Wehrpflicht) was an essential element in the 
Bundeswehr’s ability to maintain adequate force levels, was a main source of 
longer term volunteers and career soldiers, and more importantly, was necessary 
to keep the military firmly rooted in and aware of its place in a democratic society.  
The decision to retain conscription or to move to an all-volunteer professional 
force is a very contentious issue in Germany today, and will be discussed in 
detail in following chapters, but what should be mentioned here is that despite 
growing pressure to abolish conscription (including pressure from the NATO 
Secretary General), Struck firmly stood by the continued necessity of compulsory 
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military service.  However, since overall personnel levels over the last several 
years have not required the services of all individuals eligible in a particular year 
group, the total number of recruits was reduced by 15,000, down to a new level 
of 50,000.   
 The second big question, which has plagued Germany since unification, is 
money.  Given that Germany’s defense spending is fixed at 24.4 billion euros 
until 2006, how can the MoD find the means to modernize its forces without new 
money?  As outlined above, Struck is emphasizing collaboration and pooling of 
resources with other European partners as well as the need for role 
specialization and jointness of thinking at home.  He also hopes to free up 
enough funds to increase research and development by about 100 million euros, 
and raise procurement funds by about .5 billion euros.  Some of this money will 
come from the savings of another round of base closures (100 of the 530 
remaining bases will be closed), and further personnel reductions (32,000 
uniformed and 70,000 civilian positions will be cut).196    
 The most recent round of Bundeswehr reforms, announced at a joint press 
conference by Defense Minister Struck and his military chief General Wolfgang 
Schneiderhan on 13 January 2004, have certainly not disappointed observers of 
German military transformation who have become accustomed to seeing 
increasingly more bold and revolutionary changes in the armed forces.  The 2004 
reform plan, called Konzeption und Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr (Concept 
and Further Development of the German Armed Forces), is the maturation of 
Struck’s concept of jointness within the Bundeswehr and is an answer to the 
question of how Germany intends to modernize and streamline its forces to 
handle conflict prevention and crisis management without additional funding.  In 
their truly joint vision, the Struck-Schneiderhan concept divides the German 
armed forces into three types of forces: Eingreifkräfte (crisis reaction forces), 
Stabilisierungskräfte (stabilization forces), and Unterstützungskräfte (support 
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forces).197  While the individual services still retain their own identity, all of their 
assets and personnel will be rolled into the three new categories of forces.   
 The Bundeswehr’s crisis reaction forces will be maintained at the highest 
state of readiness, trained and equipped to execute worldwide multinational high 
intensity operations in all dimensions (land, air, and see).  The crisis reaction 
forces will consist of about 35,000 soldiers from all branches service and be 
organized at division level.  They will have the most modern equipment possible 
to include the ability to conduct network centric operations.  Germany’s 
contribution to the NATO Response Force and the EU’s rapid crisis reaction 
forces will come out of this category.198   
 Stabilization forces are intended to handle middle to low intensity 
operations of a longer duration, to include long term peace keeping and 
separation of combating forces, embargo enforcement, and assistance with civil 
reconstruction operations.  A total of about 70,000 soldiers from all services will 
be sub-divided into brigade level units consisting of about 14,000 soldiers each, 
giving Germany the capacity to execute up to five separate mid to low intensity 
operations simultaneously.199   
 The support forces will encompass the remaining 137,500 soldiers and 
about 75,000 civilians of the armed forces, including about 40,000 personnel in 
training status.  The main mission of this category will be the long term 
sustainment and support of deployments across the full range of the operational 
spectrum.  To get down to these numbers, an overall reduction of about 35,000 
soldiers and 10,000 civilians will be necessary.200      
 Obviously in order to achieve the level of jointness envisioned in this plan, 
certain changes are necessary within the individual services.  For the army, this 
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means the total number of divisions will go from eight to five, with one of the five 
being designated to command and control the army portion of the crisis reaction 
forces.  For the air force, the number of Luftwaffe divisions will be reduced from 
four to three, with the anticipation of the air transport command going away once 
the European Union’s air transport command is established.  For the navy, the 
previous six types of flotillas will be reduced to only two types.  Also still to be 
resolved is the participation of conscript soldiers in these three categories of 
forces.  Article 35 of the German constitution (Basic Law) prohibits requiring 
draftees to serve in deployments outside German territory, although volunteers 
with the proper training are allowed to participate.  As Generalinspekteur 
Schneiderhan observed, this is an open question which must be answered 
through more detailed planning over the next few months.201    
 The 2004 concept also clarified the road ahead for modernization and 
procurement.  Of key importance is Germany’s ability to operate on par with the 
United States in what is called network centric warfare.  To that end, Struck 
announced that this year he will ask the German parliament to approve the first 
phase of the armed forces common information management system.  He also 
confirmed the continued procurement of the strategic reconnaissance system 
SAR LUPE, the acquisition of the MPA 3C Orion aircraft for the navy, and the 
acquisition of the DINGO and GTK light armored vehicles for the army.  The 
Bundeswehr will continue to pursue the purchases of the TIGER, MH 90 and NH 
90 helicopters, and the Eurofighter combat aircraft.  However, programs that will 
no longer be pursued are the navy’s UAV development, the MARS air defense 
system, and the purchase of the improved Patriot missile.202    
 Although controversial to some in Germany, including the former Army 
Chief of Staff General Gudera who asked for early retirement only days after 
Struck announced his 2004 concept, Germany’s latest transformation efforts are 
seen by many experts as compatible with the new challenges it will face in the 
post 9/11 world.  Struck’s road map, if successful, will give the Bundeswehr the 
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ability to deal with the challenges of global asymmetric warfare while 
incorporating innovations in technology and lessons learned from the revolution 
in military affairs.  While critics argue that the 2004 concept still has not properly 
dealt with the tough issues of conscription and lack of financing, many supporters 
feel Struck and company have gone farther than previous administrations in 
instituting the necessary reforms and reductions to keep the Bundeswehr a 
leading force in multinational and international operations.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
 As this chapter has explored in detail, over the last 14 years the German 
armed forces have undergone almost constant change in an effort to deal with 
the various internal and external forces influencing German defense and security 
policy.  Undoubtedly, the various aspects of a firmly established German political 
and strategic culture have played an instrumental role in the outcome of these 
reform efforts.  The long held belief among Germans that the use of force should 
only be applied to the defense of German territory and even then done so 
through the allied structure of NATO, has had a strong restraining effect upon the 
Bundeswehr and its willingness to operate “out of area.”  Likewise, the strict 
interpretation of the German Basic Law concerning the use of military forces has 
influenced the role of the Bundeswehr since days of Helmut Kohl, and still plays 
an important role today.   
 But as the post-Cold War security environment began to unfold throughout 
the 1990s, equally strong strategic cultural beliefs started to influence German 
security policy and the Bundeswehr.  Chief among them was the strong desire for 
Germany to prove its trustworthiness and reliability as an ally and partner among 
the Western community of nations.  As Germany increasingly came under 
pressure to contribute resources and forces to the multitude of peacekeeping and 
contingency missions encountered in the mid to late 1990s, this desire to be 
Bündnisfähig, a reliable ally, began to eclipse the countervailing desire to stay 
out of the spotlight and keep German troops at home.  Coupled with the fact that 
Germans give primacy of place to multinational and international institutions, 
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German politicians found it exceedingly more difficult to ignore the calls for 
participation from the UN and NATO in areas such as the Persian Gulf, the 
Balkans, and later Afghanistan.   
 With this new interpretation of Germany’s international security 
responsibilities, came a need to reinterpret the role and missions of the 
Bundeswehr.  Its Cold War force structures and Warsaw Pact era doctrine was 
outdated and ill suited for the new post-Cold War security environment.  As this 
chapter has outlined, the Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defense has struggled to 
come to grips with these new challenges, and has taken a step-wise and 
incremental approach over the years toward gradually bringing the German 
armed forces into the 21st Century and more in line with its allies and partners.  
Although being pressured from internal forces (political parties and public 
opinion) to go one way and from external pressures (NATO, EU, and US) to go 
another, MoD and Bundeswehr leaders have used what has been called “salami 
tactics” to make incremental reforms which always had to stay within the 
acceptable middle ground between the two opposite forces.  As one German 
foreign policy expert observed, such “salami tactics” served to broaden the 
permissible scope of action for the more difficult issues such as out of area 
deployments, and the abolition of conscription.203  As of early 2004, it seems as if 
these tactics have at least allowed Germany to solve the out of area problem.  
Today some 10,000 German soldiers are serving in various deployments around 
the world, and Defense Minister Struck’s idea of German defense beginning at 
the Hindu Kush no longer invites the strong reaction it once did.   
 That is not to say there are not still major challenges that lie ahead for the 
Bundeswehr and for German defense policy.  Germany, along with other 
European nations, are still under pressure from NATO and the US to increase 
their defense spending, and the German economy is still reeling from the effects 
of the world economic slump experienced after 9/11.  With Germany’s defense 
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budget fixed until 2006, this problem is not likely to be resolved any time soon.  
Then there is the issue of conscription.  The government is coming under 
increasing pressure from liberal political parties, as well as NATO, who belief 
Germany should move to an all volunteer and professional force, albeit for 
different reasons.  This issue, along with other major challenges to German 
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IV.  CONCLUSION    
Previous chapters of this essay have discussed in detail the history and 
nature of German national security culture; the implications this culture and its 
internal-external linkages have had upon post-Cold War foreign policy; as well as 
examining the influence of these factors upon reform and transformation efforts 
of the German armed forces—the Bundeswehr.  But what should be said of the 
contemporary political and operating environment of German defense reform 
today?  How are those in the driver’s seat of policy making today dealing with the 
challenges that face them, and more importantly, how are those most effected by 
these policies (the soldiers and civilians of the Bundeswehr) dealing with the 
outcome?  This concluding chapter seeks to answer these questions and to put 
the major issues discussed thus far into their current context by examining how 
the current political parties, government officials, and soldiers of the Bundeswehr 
see and understand the issues of German security and defense policy and 
Bundeswehr transformation.   
This chapter will attempt to conclude the discussion of strategic culture 
and defense reform by taking a snapshot of current political and administration 
views on the sensitive issue of national security policy, and also by taking a brief 
glimpse at an often overlooked but important perspective—the one of the 
German soldiers themselves.  How do the men and women of the Bundeswehr 
picture the recent efforts at military modernization, reform, and transformation?   
 
A.  THE POLITICAL LEVEL 
Beginning at the political level, there are indeed both converging and 
diverging views concerning the future of German security and defense policy and 
Bundeswehr transformation.  As in any modern democratic society, the various 
political parties in Germany have developed their distinct positions on the most 
pressing issues confronting security and defense policy today over time, and 
through a mixture of party politics, pragmatic analysis, and real world experience.  
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While there are certainly many unresolved issues surrounding Germany’s current 
security and defense reform efforts, the views and positions of the major political 
parties can best be accomplished by looking at four main issues facing them 
today.  These issues are:204  
• Germany’s fundamental strategic and security goals (what is 
Germany fighting for?)  
• The use of the German armed forces inside German territory (what 
is the Bundeswehr’s domestic role?)  
• Conscription, the argument for and against mandatory military 
service (the Wehrpflicht)  
• The overall progress and direction of Bundeswehr transformation 
(is it working?)   
 Interestingly, the first of these four issues will most likely not appear in the 
headlines of any newspaper and is not openly questioned by the German public, 
but it is an issue that one can find being discussed among the political and 
security insiders of at least the main opposition party (the CDU/CSU).  The 
question, “Wofür kämpfen wir” (what are we fighting for) has been posed by the 
conservative opposition and refers to their allegation that the Schröder 
government has in effect put the cart before the horse in the area of security 
strategy.205   
 According to this train of thought, by launching a series of fundamental 
defense reforms beginning in 1992 with Rudolf Scharping, and continuing today 
with Peter Struck, the Red/Green government began defense restructuring and                                             
204 It should be noted that these four issues were the main themes of discussion during the 
author’s personal interviews with several members of the German Parliament (Bundestag), 
security experts from the various political parties, and officials within the German Ministry of 
Defense: Erich Vad, CDU/CSU security advisor; Helmut Rauber (CDU), Bundestag 
representative; Hans-Peter Bartels (SPD), Bundestag representative; Friedel Eggelmeyer, FDP 
security advisor; Winfried Nachtwei (Green Party), Bundestag representative; Jürgen 
Schnappertz, Planning Staff, German Ministry of Defense; LTC Peter Frank, German General 
Staff Officer (Fü S III 3); LTC Alexander Burmeister and Mr. Czeniek, Security and Defense 
Advisors to the German Parliament (Bundestag).   
205 This question and line of reasoning was presented to the author during a personal 
interview with a security and defense policy advisor to the CDU/CSU party; 3 May 2004. 
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technical transformation before they even dealt with the basic question of overall 
national security strategy.  In short, this has led to the adoption of an intervention 
army mindset, which was realized throughout the 1990s in numerous 
humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions, before the main political leaders 
had a chance to discuss and debate the fundamental direction of German 
national security policy.  The CDU/CSU is calling for a new debate over the main 
direction and goals of German security strategy.  They see the current 
Bundeswehr being overly deployed on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions 
abroad when there are serious security needs not being met at home.  Chief 
among these unmet needs at home is the protection of Germany and its citizens 
from the dangers of international terrorism.  The CDU/CSU feels not enough 
attention is being placed in this area, and is calling for renewed public debate on 
the dangers posed by terrorist threats and the appropriate preventative measures 
that should be taken against these dangers.206   
 The senior partner in the ruling Red/Green coalition, the SPD, feels the 
question of basic security strategy and direction has been answered through the 
various defense white papers and other official documents published since 1992, 
with the latest white paper due out sometime in 2005.  They hold that the 
drastically changed security situation after the end of the Cold War called for 
precisely the types of forces created by the government and which were 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter.  The SPD feels they are in no way 
ignoring the dangers of international terrorism and that the current efforts of 
Bundeswehr transformation will contribute to greater homeland security.  As has 
been previously mentioned, the SPD believes in the widest possible definition of 
security, meaning not only purely military forces, but including proactive 
diplomatic initiatives, working with international and regional organizations, and 
foreign aide to developing countries in an effort to deal with the root causes of 
terrorism as well as being prepared for their consequences.   
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 Through their real world experience as the junior partner in the ruling 
coalition, and by inheriting the key cabinet position of Foreign Minister, the 
Green/Bündnis 90 Party, has developed what some might consider a surprisingly 
pragmatic position on the question of national security strategy.  As was noted by 
one leading Green Party member, Germany can not hide behind multilateralism.  
He agrees that the question of “what are we fighting for” should be asked and 
debated, but sees the Green party answers much different from those of the 
CDU/CSU.207  The Green party sees overall security strategy very much like the 
SPD, in that the international security environment calls for an intervention army 
of sorts, and that Germany needs the types of forces being created through the 
latest transformation efforts.  However, they feel that Germany should not allow 
the principle of multilateralism to become an excuse to delay making the tough 
decisions necessary to stay true to its own foreign and security policy goals.  
Unlike the CDU/CSU, the Green Party does not include among the goals, an 
increased role for the Bundeswehr in homeland security.  Instead, this is mainly 
in reference to the continued adherence by the government on mandatory 
military service (the Wehrpflicht), which the Green Party has wanted to abolish 
for several years.    
 On the issue of national security strategy, the liberal Free Democrat Party 
(FDP) is not too far from the main SPD/Green coalition view point in that it 
agrees with the wider definition of security, and places a premium upon working 
with international organizations, the UN, the EU, and NATO.  However, the FDP 
joins the Green Party in calling for the abolishment of conscription and feels a 
much smaller, although highly capable and highly trained and equipped, 
professional Bundeswehr should be created.  In terms of facing the threat of 
international terrorism, the FDP feels too much attention has been placed on 
Afghanistan and not enough attention has been focused on the Middle-East and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.208   
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 While the debate over the overall direction of national security strategy 
has predominantly taken place among the political elites and out of the public 
eye; discussion over the use of the Bundeswehr inside German territory can be 
found in most newspaper headlines and is being made into a very public issue by 
most of the major political parties.  Given the history of Germany’s experience 
with the role of the armed forces inside its own society, one can understand why 
this issue is such a hot button topic, despite the fact that after 9/11 Germany was 
forced to take a hard look at its own domestic security and anti-terrorism 
arrangements.  In fact, it is mainly due to the bleak memories of the National 
Socialists time (Nazi era) that all but one political party sees a very limited role for 
the Bundeswehr inside Germany.   
 The CDU/CSU feels the dangers presented by non-state actors and 
international terrorist organizations calls for a greatly expanded role of the 
Bundeswehr in domestic security operations.  They would even like to see an 
amendment to the Basic Law made in order to clarify and increase the 
involvement of the Bundeswehr in domestic anti-terrorists operations, including 
strengthening air, see, and land security.  Additionally, the CDU/CSU feels the 
Bundeswehr has a lot to offer in the realm of emergency medical preparedness, 
nuclear biological and chemical defense, and intelligence support to domestic 
authorities.  One of their main arguments in favor of this increased role of the 
Bundeswehr in domestic security is the fact that Bundeswehr soldiers on 
deployments to places like Afghanistan and Kosovo are successfully executing 
the same type of security tasks their which are forbidden inside Germany.  They 
see no reason why German soldiers should not be allowed to carry out the same 
tasks inside their own country that they are being asked to do in another.   
 In what amounts to almost a united front against the CDU/CSU and its line 
of reasoning, are the other political parties (SPD, FDP, and Greens).  They do 
not feel the current security situation calls for such an increased role for the 
Bundeswehr in domestic operations, and are adamantly opposed to the specter 
of German troops patrolling the streets of Berlin or other German cities.  They 
hold that there is no question as to the legality of the domestic use of 
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Bundeswehr soldiers and assets in time of emergency or in the wake of a major 
catastrophic event; and therefore, see no need for a constitutional amendment.  
But they are quite clearly opposed to any blurring of the lines between civil law 
enforcement and purely military roles.  On the specific scenario of civilian 
airliners being hijacked and used as weapons of mass destruction, the 
government and ruling coalition have agreed that the chain of command to be 
used in such a case needs to be clarified and clearly understood, but they stop 
short of requiring any amendment to the Basic Law.   
 The third major issue receiving increased attention of late has been a topic 
of heated debate inside Germany for the last several years, and carries with it 
many cultural and societal emotions.  The issue is conscription and compulsory 
military service—the Wehrpflicht.  The list of arguments both for and against the 
Wehrpflicht in Germany spans the field from discussions of money, to questions 
of military efficiency, and ultimately to the much talked about principle of the 
citizen soldier, or “Staatsbürgers in Uniform.”  Over the last several years each 
political party has commissioned studies and published their own position papers 
outlining why Germany should either keep or abolish compulsory military service.  
Until April 2004, these arguments were purely political or financial in nature given 
that the German courts had always upheld the legality of the Wehrpflicht.  But 
then came the first major legal ruling against the way in which the Wehrpflicht is 
currently being carried out by the government.  In April 2004, the administrative 
court in Cologne issued a ruling saying that the current practice of issuing wide 
spread exemptions from military service and calling up only around 51% of those 
eligible for service, violated the constitution and was discriminatory and illegal in 
its current form.209  While this ruling only applied to the Cologne court’s 
jurisdictional area, it has dealt a major blow to those who still advocate the 
Wehrpflicht as militarily necessary and culturally desirable.  
 By far the party most vehemently in favor of conscription is the CDU/CSU.  
The conservatives cite among their reasons for the continuation of the 
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Wehrpflicht: a) it serves as the only sure way of keeping the military grounded in 
society and therefore, avoiding the danger of the military once again becoming a 
‘state within the state,’ b) it ensures the Bundeswehr receives recruits from all 
walks of life and all professions and not simply from those with no other 
occupational choice or no skills, c) conscripts serve as the main source of mid-
career and longer serving volunteers which constitute the mainstay of the NCO 
ranks and of the main deployment forces.  As for the latest court ruling that the 
Wehrpflicht is unfair and unconstitutional, the CDU/CSU sees the solution to this 
problem in homeland security.  By giving the Bundeswehr an increased role in 
homeland security the requirement for new recruits would increase, thereby 
forcing the government to reduce the number of allowable exemptions and bring 
in a higher percentage of eligible year groups.  At least from a mathematical point 
of view, this would solve the problem raised by the Cologne court of unfair 
conscription practices.  In short, their argument is to enlist more eligible citizens 
in the Bundeswehr and then train those not needed for out of country 
deployments in homeland security specialties.   
 The SPD is the only other political party still holding on to the position that 
the Wehrpflicht is a necessary and essential part of German security and 
defense policy.  But faced with shrinking defense budgets and the need to greatly 
reduce overall troop levels, the SPD had to continuously reduce the number of 
conscripts in a particular year group actually called into military service to the 
point that it has become unfair and inconsistent with the original constitutional 
intent of the Wehrpflicht.  This has left the SPD (as the senior party in the ruling 
coalition) in a difficult predicament.  On the one had, they rely upon the 
Wehrpflicht to fill not only the armed forces, but also the much needed Zivildienst 
positions in hospitals and rest homes where those who refuse military service 
serve out their time of required service to the government.  Loosing this pool of 
personnel could have far reaching effects for both the Bundeswehr and the 
civilian social services.  On the other hand, the government currently does not 
have the money or the political will to widen the Wehrpflicht eligibility criteria in 
order to comply with Basic Law intent.  This situation combined with increasing 
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pressure from NATO member nations to move to an all-volunteer professional 
force has led the SPD to acknowledge that the life span of the Wehrpflicht is 
about to run out.  Interestingly, this some what of a ‘damned if you do, damned if 
you don’t’ predicament has led some conservatives to charge that Minister of 
Defense Struck is simply allowing the judicial system (via rulings like those of the 
Cologne court) to make the politically unpopular choice of abolishing the 
Wehrpflicht for him.   
 While the SPD could be said to be somewhat undecided as to the future of 
the Wehrpflicht, its junior partner the Green Party and the liberal Free Democrats 
(FDP) could not be surer of their position.  These two parties are strongly 
opposed to the practice of conscription in today’s society and feel the time has 
come for Germany to move to a small, modern, all-volunteer professional force.  
The main argument used by those in favor of moving away from conscription, in 
addition to the point that it was judged illegal by the Cologne court, is that the 
post-Cold War security environment no longer requires a large territorial defense 
force, which was only sustainable back then via conscription.  Opponents to the 
Wehrpflicht hold that conscription can no longer be justified by purely military 
necessity.  Instead, both the FDP and the Greens point to the various other 
European countries that have given up conscription in favor of smaller 
professional forces with overall successful results.  They feel the increased costs 
associated with transitioning to an all-volunteer force (including better pay, 
training, and recruitment incentives), would be offset over the long term through 
reduced personnel costs and internal streamlining.   
 Regardless of which position is taken on the validity of the Wehrpflicht, 
one key factor that has contributed to the continuing argument is the lack of 
definitive evidence currently available to either prove or disprove one side or the 
other.  Surprisingly, there seems to be very little well documented research or 
analysis as to the pros and cons of transitioning from conscription to a 
professional service.  This allows for both sides to engage in the debate with little 
or no evidence to bolster their claims.  That being said, at least two relatively 
recent German studies of this issue have been published, and their well-
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researched and documented findings constructively contribute to the discussion 
here.   
 The first study was conducted by the well respected German security 
think-tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Deutsches Institut für 
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, in June 2003 and was written by Hans-
Dieter Lemke.210  Lemke and his colleagues conducted an extensively detailed 
analysis and comparison of which type of force (conscript or volunteer) could 
best carry out the missions and tasks laid out by the 2003 Defense Planning 
Guidance (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien).  This included staying within the 
overall force structure outlined in the 2003 DPG and they did not include basic 
trainee conscripts in the number of deployment forces required, since current 
German law does not require conscripts to serve overseas.  The sub-title of the 
study makes their conclusion clear, “The volunteer army is the better solution.”  
The SWP study recommends a volunteer force of 100,000 troops capable of 
conducting overseas deployments, 20,000 of which would be available for long 
term missions.211  According to the study this size volunteer force, when properly 
structured, would allow more time for adequate basic training of volunteers so as 
not to send them on out of country deployments untrained, and it would reduce 
the required re-training time between deployments due to the model’s ability to 
always provide trained and ready replacements.   
 Moreover, the study calculated that a 100,000 man volunteer force would 
be approximately 0.4 billion Euro cheaper than the proposed conscript force with 
the current 9 month Wehrpflicht.212  In terms of winning recruits for the all-
volunteer force, the study recommends an optimal length of service of between 
18 to 24 months, with a required length of overseas service of 4 months (less 
than the current 6 months in the present Bundeswehr).  Additional incentives to 
be offered would be better training in job skills that could be used in the civilian 
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sector, and financial incentives for re-enlistments and for voluntary overseas 
service.213  The study calculates that these incentives could be funded through 
the cost savings created by reducing the overall size of the armed forces, and 
that such savings should allow for an increased investment per soldier of up to 
80%.214   
 The second study was conducted by the scientific research branch of the 
German Bundestag, known as Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen 
Bundestages, Fachbereich II, in October 2003.  This study by Alexander 
Burmeister titled “Does conscription have a future? A contribution to the current 
Discussion,” is a review of the major arguments for and against the Wehrpflicht in 
Germany, and includes a look at the experiences of the seven European 
countries that have recently made the transition to all-volunteer forces.  The 
benefit of this study is that it attempts to address the major issues surrounding 
the conscription debate in Germany in a pragmatic and non-biased way.  It 
provides evidence, mainly through the experiences of other NATO countries, 
which finds many of the fears expressed about going to an all-volunteer force 
unfounded.215  For example, the fear that going to a volunteer army would 
damage the principle of the citizen in uniform and lead to a distancing of the 
soldiers from society, has not taken place in any of the other European NATO 
countries transitioning to a volunteer force.  Also, the argument that a 
professional military would eventually lead to the desire to participate in more 
and more deployments (in effect, lower the threshold for military action) has not 
been the case in France, which has had a professional force since 1996.216   
 However, in contrast to the SWP study, Burmeister’s research of other 
European armies’ transition experiences found that the cost savings expected by 
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going to a smaller professional force has not been realized.217  From looking at 
the experiences of these nations, the study reaches the conclusion that the 
investment portion of a nation’s defense budget (the amount available for 
modernization and other non-personnel costs) is directly affected by whether that 
nation has a volunteer or conscript army.218  But the most striking finding of the 
Bundestag study involves a country’s inability to attract enough volunteers to 
adequately fill its force structure requirements.  Five of the seven countries 
studied had problems meeting their recruitment needs.  The United Kingdom, 
which has been a professional force for many years, was 4% under its goal for 
the year studied; Portugal had a 15% shortfall in recruitment needs; the 
Netherlands a 20% shortfall; and worst of all was Spain, which was 25% below 
the needed recruitment numbers.219   The resulting recommendation from the 
study was that when a nation decides to make the transition to an all-volunteer 
force, they should do so gradually over a period of years so as to give time for 
recruitment efforts to take effect without serious personnel shortfalls.220   
 At the action end of all three of these current issues just discussed lays 
the Bundeswehr and its transformation efforts.  As one of the key manifestations 
of German national security culture, it is only logical to conclude our examination 
of the most current and pressing issues facing Germany today with a look at the 
overall progress and direction of Bundeswehr transformation.  As discussed in 
chapter three, funding shortfalls in the defense budget certainly constitute the 
single greatest challenge to the successful execution of the overall 
transformation program.  But upon closer examination one finds that money is 
not the only issue.   
 Conservative criticism of Bundeswehr transformation goes back to the first 
issue discussed in this section—what is the fundamental aim and goal of German 
national security policy?  The CDU/CSU feels that the technical nature of 
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Bundeswehr reform, with its particular weapons procurement programs and 
concentration on modernization, has actually been the driving factor behind 
national security strategy—not the other way around as would be expected.  This 
criticism alleges that the government and MoD are writing overall security and 
defense strategy to suit their already planned technical military transformation 
program.  This then leads to German national security and defense policy being 
held hostage by the finance ministry’s checkbook.  According to this view, 
German security and defense strategy is only as good as it ability to finance the 
technical transformation programs which are driving it.  Unfortunately, most 
experts realize there is not enough money to go around, and eventual cuts in 
some procurement and/or transformation actions will have to be made.   
 However, it is important to point out that Conservatives strongly support 
the idea of Bundeswehr modernization and transformation.  As previously 
pointed out, they see an expanded role for the Bundeswehr in the new security 
environment, strongly desire to close the capabilities gap within NATO, and they 
realize transformation is a key part of achieving these goals.  They want to 
continue Bundeswehr transformation, but they do not want it to become the 
driving factor behind national security strategy.   
 The main criticism coming from the Liberal camp of the FDP returns to 
their opposition to conscription.  The Wehrpflicht, according to the FDP, is a 
severe handicap to Bundeswehr transformation and continuing to hold on to it will 
result in a two-class army.221  They feel too much attention has been placed 
upon the deployment forces within the Bundeswehr, leaving non-deploying 
conscript forces and training units back home with little or no hope of getting the 
attention and resources they deserve.  Instead, all the best equipment and 
resources are devoted to the first class army, the Einsatzkräfte, while the 
second-class army, the other conscript training and support units, receives what 
is left over.  The FDP is concerned that over time, and with the prospects of more 
money going to defense highly unlikely, this gap between the force types will only 
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widen leading to morale and discipline problems.  They point to the latest 
parliamentary commission for military affairs yearly report (Wehrbeauftragter 
Jahresbericht) as proof of their argument.  The commission report cites examples 
of outdated and older equipment in non-deployable and training units while 
deploying forces received the latest and best equipment.222      
 For the ruling SPD, pressure has been mounting over the last few years to 
get defense reform right.  After putting the Bundeswehr through a steady string of 
one reform program after the other since 1992, Chancellor Schröder and his 
Defense Minister Struck need to finally put this issue behind them by pushing 
through a successful transformation program by 2010.  But given Germany’s 
current political and socioeconomic climate, this will not be an easy task.  Clearly 
the SPD is feeling the stress of trying to create a world-class military force on a 
shoestring budget.  Policy-wise, they are facing an up-hill battle with the 
Wehrpflicht and are now taking hits, as outlined in this chapter, on the overall 
wisdom of their national security strategy.  All of this comes at a time when 
Finance Minister Eichel is looking at reneging on his promise not to cut any 
further into the already modest defense budget until 2006.  But on a positive 
note, Defense Minister Struck has won respect from all major parties for his 
pragmatic views and no-nonsense approach to the challenges facing 
Bundeswehr transformation.   
 Partly due to having a share in the responsibilities of government, and 
partly due to world events, the Green party has developed a surprisingly 
pragmatic view toward Bundeswehr transformation.  They do not wish to see the 
military under-funded and are entirely supportive of the general transformation 
plan and its three types of forces.  Having been a part of the ruling coalition for 
seven years now, they also have developed an appreciation for how the military 
has a role in defining and protecting Germany’s national interests.  But they part 
company from their coalition brethren when it comes to the Wehrpflicht and still 
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see no need to try and create military forces comparable to France, Britain, and 
the United States.   
 From the summary of the various arguments and positions outlined above, 
it is easy to get the impression there are virtually no areas of agreement among 
the major parties in the area of security policy and defense reform.  But that is 
not the case.  There is total consensus and support for the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for the specific military 
oriented European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  All major parties 
recognize that Europeans must work together in the security and defense arena, 
and therefore, there is unanimous support for the idea of role specialization 
within European armed forces.  In a sense, it can be viewed as tremendous 
progress that the different political parties and factions are debating the various 
nuances and details of security and defense policy.  After all, it was not so many 
years ago that Germans were debating on whether to have a military force at all.       
 
B.  THE SOLDIER LEVEL 
It is appropriate and necessary to closely examine the ideas of national 
security culture, security and defense policy, and armed forces transformation 
from the political elite and governmental or ministerial level.  It is at this level that 
decisions are made, policies written, and political compromises met.  But equally 
important and worthy of inclusion are the attitudes, opinions, and experiences of 
those at the action end of the policies and decisions made at the higher levels.  
This means, of course, looking at the individual soldier and small unit level.  It is 
at this level that the high words of government officials and the headlines of 
transformation give way to the straight talk of sergeants and the uneasy feelings 
of new recruits.   
One of the best sources for insights into the issues and concerns of the 
men and women of the Bundeswehr is the annual report by the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Military Affairs, or Wehrbeauftragte des Deutschen 
Bundestages.  The goal of the Commissioner is to provide oversight on behalf of 
the German Parliament of the treatment, condition, and welfare of the men and 
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women of the German armed forces.  Each year the Commissioner complies a 
list of all official soldier complaints registered at his office and publishes an 
overall assessment of his findings in the form of the yearly report.  Admittedly, 
such a report of only negative complaints contains largely anecdotal information 
and its content must be analyzed carefully, and viewed in comparison with 
previous year’s reports.  Never the less, the Commissioner’s report receives 
public attention in Germany and is a good source for insight into the specific 
problems and complaints of the soldiers themselves.   
The 2003 annual report, prepared by the Parliamentary Commissioner, Dr. 
Willfried Penner, was released on 9 March 2004 and contains some noteworthy 
observations.  Overall, the 6,082 total complaints were down by 354 over last 
year, with the majority of the complaints, 1,980, centering on the issue of 
promotion and personal advancement.  But the most interesting finding, and the 
most germane to this thesis, was the amount of object difficulties resulting from 
the “unrelenting pressure of the chain of Bundeswehr reforms during the past 
decade.”223  In fact it was some of these “difficulties” related to the pressure of 
Bundeswehr reform that grabbed the headlines upon the report’s public release.  
According to an article from the German Press Agency, 
The annual report shows top line equipment and experienced 
soldiers are earmarked for German military missions in Afghanistan 
and the Balkans, while troops at home have to make do with 
whatever is left over.224    
One negative side effect of pursuing defense reform in a time of increased 
international deployments and funding shortfalls, is that, as Commissioner 
Penner himself said, “Improvising is the name of the game.”  The press article 
highlighted an example from a German armored battalion that was supposed to 
have 44 operational tanks.  10 tanks were unavailable because they had been 
mothballed, a further 14 tanks were missing after being commandeered by a 
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rapid reaction force, and many of the remaining 20 tanks were in varying states 
of disrepair.225     
 Another useful mechanism for gaining insight into the Bundeswehr comes 
from a set of public opinion polls commissioned in 2003 by the Ministry of 
Defense and conducted by two separate private polling services.226  Although 
these polls do not specifically represent the attitudes and feelings of just 
Bundeswehr soldiers, both were conducted nationwide and one only polled those 
in the 16 to 20 year old group—an age group that could potentially be very much 
effected by conscription and Bundeswehr issues.   
 When asked to respond to the statement, “Mandatory military service is an 
important citizen obligation,” 60% of the respondents either fully or partially 
agreed.227  This speaks to the well-established German national security culture 
that holds the principle of “citizen in uniform” in high regard, and proves that 
despite allegations of pacifism among German society, the overwhelming 
majority of Germans see military service as one of the most important civic 
duties.  When this same audience was then asked if Germany should retain 
conscription or transition to a volunteer force, the results were almost equally 
split 50-50.  However, when the question of the Wehrpflicht was posed to just the 
16-20 year old group, a full 63% of those polled decided for the all-volunteer 
army.228  This clearly indicates that while the general population is undecided on 
the important issue of the Wehrpflicht, those most likely to be called-up for 
military service favor the volunteer system.   
 Interestingly, when the 16-20 year old audience was asked to give their 
personal overall impression of the Bundeswehr, 62% of the respondents had 
either a positive or rather positive view of the Bundeswehr.  This is virtually the 
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same percentage of young people who felt Germany should transition to an all-
volunteer force.  This positive image of the Bundeswehr was confirmed by the 
results from another poll question, which asked respondents to list the public 
service professions in which they had the most trust.  The Bundeswehr was 
ranked as the third most trusted public service profession, with the police and the 
Supreme Court ranking number one and two respectively.  But these 
encouraging results were balanced by the rather low numbers of Germans who 
said they had any interest at all in security and defense issues, and the extremely 
low percentage of the population that was specifically interested in the 
Bundeswehr.  Only about 14% of those polled said they were “very interested” in 
security and defense policy and about 41% said they had “little interest.”  When 
asked specifically about the Bundeswehr, only 9% said they were “very 
interested,” and 50% said they had “little interest” in the armed forces.  However, 
it should be noted that these 2003 results are actually a slight improvement over 
the 2002 opinion poll results which asked the same questions.  Not withstanding 
the effects of German political and strategic culture on these numbers, perhaps 
the biggest reason for such relative indifference of the population to security and 
defense issues is the overwhelming preoccupation of most people on 
unemployment.  With current unemployment levels in Germany reaching 
between 10 and 12 percent, it is understandable that when asked what the most 
important political task facing the government was, 84% said creating jobs and 
lowering the unemployment rate.  Likewise, only 11% cited working for a 
Common European Security Policy as an important task.229   
 While one must always be weary of placing too much value in opinion poll 
results, these 2003 results do shed considerable light upon how German society 
perceives security and defense policy in general and how they feel about the 
Bundeswehr specifically.  The opinions reflected in these polls seem to confirm 
the conclusions of this essay regarding the nature and influence of strategic 
culture upon the way in which Germans interpret the world around them, and its 
effects upon military and defense reform specifically.  One can conclude that 
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while recent external forces (like ethnic violence and international terrorism) have 
made Germans more aware of security and defense issues, key internal forces 
(mainly the culture of Zurückhaltung and unemployment) have kept the majority’s 
attention turned toward economic and social issues.                    
 
C.  SUMMARY 
By examining these rather different current perspectives from both the 
political and soldier level it becomes evident that culture does matter, but present 
realities also matter.  If we are to find an appropriate ending point to the 
discussions of this thesis it must be in the acknowledgement that German 
national security culture has evolved and matured since 1989; and the 
Bundeswehr has come along for the ride, often times even seizing the steering 
wheel and becoming the driving force behind reform.  Germany has struggled to 
find its way along the confusing and rapidly changing path of security and 
defense issues in the 21st century.  Along the way it has confronted many of the 
demons of the past that have plagued German society and defense intellectuals 
for decades, and slowly in a step-wise fashion Germany has fielded a modern 
military force commensurate with its political will and weight.   
As to whether Germany has now “normalized” in the field of foreign and 
security policy this author is not qualified to judge, but through the tremendous 
stresses and strains of the post-Cold War environment Germany has emerged as 
a different nation with a different Bundeswehr than before.  There are, to be sure, 
security and defense related challenges ahead and several key questions still 
have to be answered.  But there have also been lessons learned and problems 
solved.  And it is on this point that the conclusion of this study would like to 
concentrate.  It should be noted that the title of this thesis is “…a struggle to be 
understood.”  What should be understood is that since the end of the Cold War, 
German leaders have engaged in the classic internal-external debate required in 
the formulation of foreign and security policy, and have done so as only Germany 
can.  The various political, popular, and governmental interests have worked to 
find the needed consensus which Hanrieder described.  This process was and is 
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often complicated, sometimes clumsy, and always involved a junior coalition 
partner.  This is a point that seems to often be misunderstood or even overlooked 
by many of Germany’s western friends and allies.  This includes the United 
States of America.  As Donald Abenheim observed, “Since the early 1960s, too 
few American observers of policy have given enough attention to the workings of 
diplomacy and strategy amongst the Atlantic democracies.”230   
Unfortunately in the most recent case of the German position on the US-
led Iraq war, this has led to what most writers are calling the ‘trans-Atlantic rift,’ 
and a most uncomfortable German-American relationship.  If this rift is to be 
overcome, and a return to a better more trustworthy relationship accomplished, 
then it must come through a better understanding and appreciation of what has 
been discussed in this thesis.  That is an appreciation of national security culture 
and the effects of such culture upon policy decisions.  The tendency to interpret 
foreign and security policy in strictly realists terms, and simply in terms of being 
for or against a particular action only goes so far, and is precisely the type of 
tunnel vision that contributes to misunderstandings and wrong impressions.  It is 
this author’s belief that only through an understanding of and an appreciation for 
where Germany has been, the culture that has influenced it, and the progress 
that has already been made, can the story of German foreign and defense policy 
since the end of the Cold War be properly understood.  With these things in 
mind, not only can the current trans-Atlantic rift be overcome, but Germany itself 
will find it easier to answer the questions that lie ahead and to build the 
consensus needed to settle the debates of the future.     
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